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BAHR AFFIRMS NEED FOR CLOSE U.S.-EUROPEAN DEFENSE TIES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Jul 80 p 4

[Text] The relationship between the FRG and the United States emerges more and more as one of the most important themes of the approaching "hot phase" of the campaign. After the CDU's Kiep reported last week after his trip to the United States about resignation and thwarted expectations regarding the attitude of Europeans, and after party chairman Kohl spoke of American disillusion and disappointment with the Germans, the SPD's Bahr reported exactly the opposite as his impression of his talks in Washington and Detroit. In his opinion, the relationship between the United States and the FRG is "at the moment nearly without problems." He said that the respect for the FRG chancellor, especially after the results of his Moscow trip and his attitude in the Soviet capital, is "almost equally great" among Republicans and Democrats in America. Contrary to the impression which exixts in the FRG, he had not found any people in Washington who questioned the alliance or had any doubts about it. As far as the reliability of the alliance and the FRG is concerned, there was no question of a crisis.

During his 9-day trip Bahr had met with the American security adviser Brzezinski, with his deputy Aaron and with the President's campaign manager Strauss. In Detroit he spoke with Minority Leader Baker, with former Secretary of State Kissinger, and with Reagan's foreign affairs advisor, Allan. The SPD politician wanted to find out during his journey exactly what role foreign policy is playing in the campaign of the two political parties in America. Bahr said about the talks, which "had been started in principle" between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the medium-range weapons, that they were at present a test of the possibility which had been created by the chancellor's trip. He said that a differentiation must be made between talks and negotiations and that at present both sides are in an exploratory phase which could take months, in order to determine whether a basis for negotiations could be created. Only then would the interlocutors be able to say whether they would embark on concrete negotiations or not. The American administration is of the opinion that conditions for exploratory talks are good.

According to Bahr, the results of the German-French consultations and of President Giscard's visit made no difference in his talks in the United States. Bahr said regarding the discussion about greater European independence even in the area of security: "There is no security in and for Europe without the United States.

9328
CSO: 3103

NATION'S TACTICAL AIR FORCE OF 1980 REVIEWED

Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Jun 80 pp 11-19

[Article by G. de Briganti]

[Text] Last April 15th, a trip for the press was organized by the Air Force Public Relations Service in order to introduce the Tactical Air Force [TAC] to specialized journalists. This visit, presided over by Air Force Lieutenant General Forget, commander of TAC, gives us the opportunity to introduce this large Air Force high command to our readers.

Organization and Missions

The Tactical Air Force [TAC] is one of the four large operational high commands of the Air Force, the other three being the Air Command of the Air Defense Forces (CAFDA), the Command of the Strategic Air Forces (COFAS) and the Command of Military Air Transport (COFAM). However, in relation to these other operational groups, TAC has 2 characteristics which differentiate it: on the one hand, it is the only operational command which has competence over the entire territory, and, on the other, it is the only command which has an exclusively offensive character.

The territory-wide competence of TAC was bestowed on it for, at the time of the formation of this command, in 1964, it was noted that a very large majority of the units which were assigned to it were deployed on the territory of the 1st Air Region [RA]. This presented a unique opportunity to economize on a territorial command which was revealed, on paper, to be superfluous, and it was thus decided to place in the hands of the TAC command the territory-wide competence of the 1st Air Region Command.

The offensive character of TAC comes from its principal mission, which remains the attack and destruction of any ground forces which penetrate the national territory, initially by means of conventional weapons, then, if the President of the Republic so decides, by means of the tactical nuclear arm.

In order to get a better grip on what TAC presently is, we shall first describe briefly its territorial, then its operational characteristics.

The 1st Air Region

The 1st Air Region [RA], whose territory covers, in large measure, the northeast of France, has available 12 air batteries, of which 7 bases are assigned to TAC, 3 radar bases, one base assigned to CAFDA (the base at Reims where the 30th Fighter Squadron is stationed) and 2 bases in West Germany (Achern and Berlin). The peculiarity of the 1st RA is that it is in its territory that the quasi-totality of TAC units are stationed, with the exception of only two squadrons, one at Bordeaux, the other, just being assembled, as Istres, both equipped with Jaguars. The interest which this identity between the territorial command and the operational command offers is great. To quote the words of General Forget, commander of TAC 1st RA, "the fact of having available both the forces and their support--general as well as specialized--is a considerable trump for these forces most open to numerous and rapid redeployment." Additionally, that eliminates any conflict of priority between "territorial" and "operational" imperatives, which makes possible rational planning where the only criterion is the urgency of the action to be carried out, and no longer its administrative classification.

Having available one single integrated organization to deal with operational and territorial questions, the TAC command functions under excellent cost efficiency and time-lag conditions, which is especially valuable in infrastructure and logistics problems, among which for example the activation of secondary fronts and degagement. Furthermore, the organization of a command post (PC) in which all territorial and operational questions are under the jurisdiction of the same authority makes it possible to arrive at very satisfying results in extremely reduced periods of time.

A very eloquent example of the advantages TAC derives from its integration with the 1st RA is furnished by the group of programs presently on-going, intended to reduce the vulnerability of the bases (territorial responsibility) so as to increase the availability of combat units (operational responsibility). These 4 programs concern more specifically 4 directions which are granted high priority:

--the reinforcement of protection and defense on the ground: the several thousand Air commando-riflemen will see their number increased and, on the other hand, ground obstacles (barbed wire, miradors, antitank ditchs, etc) will be multiplied.

--the camouflage of installations: in order to make vital installations less vulnerable, camouflage is presently being applied to runways, taxi-ways and other operational installations: they are painted and then integrated into the physical surroundings intended to hide them (clumps of trees, "hills," etc).

--the reinforcement of anti-aircraft defense, by the positioning of Crotale squadrons and 20 mm bitube guns.

--the hardening of installations: on the one hand, the construction of reinforced shelters for each airplane (presently being finished) and, on the other hand, the construction of PC and shelters for the personnel, underground and equipped with protection against NBC agents.

These 4 programs would normally be entrusted to the territorial authority: in the case of TAC, the fact that they are organized and followed up by a single command assures their completion under the most optimal conditions possible.

Missions

An offensive operational command, TAC's principal mission is "to seek out and destroy adverse forces, wherever they are found." This general mission includes, in fact, for conventional missions, 3 successive stages.

Firstly, at the outbreak of a conflict, TAC must seek out the enemy, localize it, and specify the axes of the incursion or the intentions: this initial mission devolves on the tactical reconnaissance squadrons.

TAC must then attack enemy forces on the ground, by direct tactical support missions (in direct or indirect support of our ground troops in the battle-field zone) as well as by attack on the ground, deep within the enemy set-up, where the latter is concentrating its reinforcements, locates the sources of its logistic support, and prepares any ground attack.

However, this mission implies a complementary mission of air-to-air combat, for it is generally in its rear that the enemy concentrates its tactical air units. This involves on the one hand, assuring the air cover of our own ground forces, in order to protect them from tactical enemy aviation. On the other hand, and TAC's offensive character surfaces again, it involves attacking, on their airfields, tactical enemy units, by carrying out preventive attacks in order to neutralize them.

These missions have, of course, an exclusively conventional character: TAC equally has a nuclear mission, that of deterrent, which is entirely specific, and which is, in the last analysis, the key element of any TAC manoeuvre in case of conflict in Europe. The airborne nuclear strike, which can only be decided upon, as the use of any nuclear weapon, by the Chief of State, has a tactical character, that is to say, it is focused on enemy forces, to the exclusion of any other objective. The setting in motion of the TAC nuclear mission, like that of the Pluto missile by the Army, has principally political significance: such a nuclear strike, in fact, "constitutes an event of exceptional gravity, not only by virtue of the level of losses that it aims to inflict on enemy forces, but also because it places the adversary unambiguously before the ultimate threat of our strategic nuclear forces." This strike has therefore a double aspect: to bring about the

stop of any enemy attack, by inflicting very large losses (the "stop hit" on the entire enemy depth), and to signify to the enemy the response which any possible persistence in his offensive manoeuvres would trigger.

Fields of Action

If it is likely that TAC will principally be called upon to intervene in covering the north and northeast frontiers of France--thus the deployment of its units on the territory of the 1st RA--this does not mean for all that that is its sole framework of action. Its adaptation of the First Army only constitutes, in fact, one of its fields of action. Indeed, TAC must be capable of operating, with all or part of its means, wherever the situation requires, in Europe or outside of Europe. If the 1st Tactical Air Command (1st CAT) is turned more towards cooperation with the 1st Army, the 2nd CAT has a structure which makes possible its adaptation to another command, ground or maritime--with a view to the conduct of operations, predominately conventional, in case of a flash crisis in Europe or overseas.

Given the breadth of its missions, the diversity of its fields of action, and the variety of its interventions, the TAC organization must be highly flexible. This flexibility is characterized by two principal aspects: the TAC units are very mobile (including its PCs, means of communication, its control centers and its logistics) and, generally speaking, they are earmarked, principally, to operate within the framework of combined actions.

TAC's Means

TAC currently has available 21 squadrons, whose means represent 315 combat airplanes, 13 squadrons of different versions of Mirage IIIs and 8 Jaguar squadrons, a ninth being planned (it will be deployed at Istres and will have a nuclear mission).

What characterizes the TAC units is first of all their versatility. Indeed, each squadron has a principal mission, to which it devotes about 70 percent of its training, and which varies according to the wing; it has in addition a secondary mission, which represents 30 percent of its training, which varies according to the type of airplane. For example, the Jaguars' principal mission is attack on the ground and tactical support; certain squadrons have, for secondary mission, reconnaissance, so as to permit them to protect the 3 Mirage III R and III RD squadrons of the 33rd Reconnaissance Wing.

This makes it possible, in case of need, to multiply the number of planes which can carry out a given mission, whence very great operational flexibility.

Specific Missions

If the general mission of the TAC units is the air-to-surface mission, it is carried out in different ways according to the material or weaponry of

each wing. Four specific missions can be distinguished, of which three are specific to one or several squadrons, and one is specific to the type of plane. Care must be exercized, however, not to confuse these missions (reconnaissance, 'Martel' [Hammer], nuclear and pinpoint defense) with the secondary missions of each squadron.

Reconnaissance is necessarily the first among these missions, in chronological order. This mission is incumbent, first of all, on the 33rd Reconnaissance Wing of Strasburg, which is charged with "the search for, gathering, processing and diffusion of air information." This unit is presently equipped with 2 versions of the Mirage III, the III R and III RD. The former, with simpler equipment, carry out missions in clear weather, while the RD, equipped with a self-contained navigation system, are assigned to all-weather flights. The reconnaissance equipment with which these planes are equipped makes possible the gathering of information, in any weather, even through clouds.

Firstly, a very large range of cameras (which are in fact photoenregistering apparatuses) makes it possible to photograph the entire extent of the overflight region, either by pictures of strips of land or overall panoramic views. These cameras are equipped with devices which compensate for the speed of the airplanes, and regulate the exposure time according to luminosity. The effectiveness of the cameras is, however, linked to meterological conditions, and in the case of faint illumination or poor visibility their usefulness becomes haphazard.

This is the moment when the thermographic pick-up is brought into play: nicknamed Cyclopes, it photographs infra-red emissions in the overflight zone and furnishes, in fact, a film rather like that of a conventional photographic film. This equipment offers the added advantage of "unmasking" hot spots, even if they are camouflaged, but their performance deteriorates when the atmosphere is cloudy, as the clouds mask the infra-red emissions. Under these conditions, the Cyclopes is complemented by a truly all-weather system, the airborne sideways-looking radar (SLAR). The pictures furnished by this device are less good and less complete but, by means of appropriate electronic processing, they furnish enough information so that specialized personnel can draw from them a good overall approximation.

The mission we have called 'Martel' is a specific mission, very similar to the one the USAF "Wild Weasel" planes carry out (cf The Monitor no 28). It involves, for the planes of the 3rd Fighter Wing [EC-3] of Nancy, attacking, by means of their Martel anti-radiation missile, enemy radar transmitters, so as to blind the adversary. Contrary to the American philosophy, which provides for "hunter-killer" patrols, the EC-3 planes would only be used, in general, against well-defined objectives, either as escort of a nuclear or conventional attack, or in preparation for such a mission. The 'Martel' mission would be critical in wartime, because it alone would make it possible for the ground attack planes of the other units to rid themselves of the biggest part of the enemy surface-to-air defense, perforce made up either of radar-guided missiles or of fighter

planes guided by the radar of interception centers which would without doubt accompany advanced enemy ground units. The information circulated about this missile is necessarily scant, but it is known that the Martel has a memory, which would make it possible to destroy a radar transmitter even if it were knocked out after firing.

The third specific mission of TAC units is the air-to-air cover mission. Within the framework of this mission, which has not been assigned to one single unit, it is question either of reinforcing the protection of CAFDA or of FAS bases, or of assuring, to a certain extent, the interception of enemy attack planes which would engage our ground units. By the force of circumstances, this mission is confided to the unit equipped with Mirage III-Es, the air-to-air capacity of the Jaguar being, when all is said and done, somewhat limited.

But it is incontestable that the ultimate mission of TAC remains the tactical nuclear mission. It was in 1972 that TAC was entrusted with the use of the tactical nuclear arm, and 2 wings are presently charged with this mission: the 4th EC of Luxeuil, equipped with Mirage III-Es, and the EC-7 of Saint-Dizier, equipped with Jaguars. The Air Forces' tactical nuclear arm, called AN 52, has a strength of over 25 kt, that is to say, it is more powerful than the "bomb" dropped on Hiroshima. The vehicles with which the 4 "nuclear" squadrons are equipped have a radius of action, at very low altitude and great speed, of from 600 to 800 kilometers (600 for the Mirages, over 750 for the Jaguars) and are capable of carrying out their mission under all-weather conditions, the Mirages thanks to their radar, the Jaguars thanks to their highly perfected navigation system.

In order to assure the penetration of "nuclear" plans TAC is able to use other air formations charged with accompanying the raid, made up some of airplanes specialized in electronic warfare (Jaguars with special equipment, 'Martel' planes), others of planes equipped with conventional air-to-surface or air-to-air weapons.

It behooves us to note that, insofar as the nuclear mission is concerned, in case of the decision to use the AN 52, several strikes, instead of only one, are planned by current policy in this matter. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the place this weapon occupies in the policy of deterrence assigns its use against objectives of a military nature to the exclusion of any other type of objective.

Current Tendencies

If, at first sight, TAC appears to constitute a combat tool very apt for the missions with which it is entrusted, efforts are currently being made by its command to constantly improve this aptitude.

These efforts are apparent especially from exercizes carried out during the last few months. The latter have mainly involved cooperation with the army or navy, as well as rapid redeployment on auxiliary bases. Other

exercises involve large scale ground attack missions, with up to 100 planes taking part at the same time, making possible a rapid, pinpoint saturation of enemy anti-aircraft defense. These missions can also make it possible for TAC, whose principal mission is to intervene against the rear of a potential attacker, to strike a brutal stop hit against any massive breakthrough of enemy ground forces, by means of a large concentration of firepower. This firepower is in fact altogether considerable. Three examples suffice to demonstrate this.

A Jaguar has a bomb-carrying capacity greater than that of a B 17 of the last war; it flies farther and at a speed one and one-half times faster than that of the American bomber.

Twelve Jaguars, or 12 Mirage 5Fs, equipped with rockets, are capable of delivering, in several seconds, a firepower equivalent to that of 3 155-mm artillery regiments firing for over 5 minutes. This firepower can be delivered over several hundred kilometers, in time-spans expressed in tens of minutes.

A Mirage 5F equipped with bombs is capable of saturating a zone on the ground 300 meters long by 50 meters wide.

However, in spite of this considerable firepower, improvements remain to be made in the field of weaponry. Firstly, TAC units have to have available more precise weapons, whose entry into service is already planned: anti-runway bombs (the Durandal, for example) and guided bombs.

Dispersion weapons, such as the Beluga, should also be used, their effectiveness against all types of concentrations (tanks, personnel, light vehicles, airplane parkings, etc) being very clearly superior to that of present-day weapons.

Special efforts must also involve the improvement of the units' electronic warfare potential. A program of this type is presently on-going, and provides for equipping a Jaguar squadron with an eye to an offensive electronic war mission, so as to reinforce the passive means already in service ("chaff" jumpmasters).

In the nuclear field, the current tactical nuclear weapon, although recent (the first one was delivered in Luxeuil in 1973), should see its force increased; it should also be equipped with its own propulsion system, which moreover is provided for by the ASMP (Air-to-Surface Middle Range) program presently under study.

TAC and Intervention Abroad

The experience acquired over these past 2 years in Africa has revealed the decisive role of tactical aviation in the conduct of these operations. It is impossible, at the present day, to intervene in such theaters with 2nd class aircraft which perform indifferently. The firepower, as well as the

rapidity of the placing and intervention have become essential factors, especially when confronting very mobile and heavily armed enemies. In the Jaguar, TAC has available a tool well adapted to this type of action. Refueling in flight, which has become common practice for all Jaguar squadrons, makes it possible to reach, non-stop, terrain 7,000 kilometers away from the mainland. On the spot, it makes possible intervention at very low altitude against objectives situated over 1,500 kilometers from the field of departure.

What information has TAC been able to draw from these interventions?

First of all, they have made possible the fine-tuning of logistic problems, linked with the use of Jaguars in a distant theater of operation, very different from the one they had been conceived for.

Next, they have pointed out the qualities of the airplane for ground attack missions; the accuracy of the firing, the value of air-to-surface weapons, but also the sturdiness of the airplane.

Finally, the Jaguar scored an excellent availability record, qualified as "close to 90 percent" in conditions which often left a lot to be desired.

On the other scale of the balance, interventions abroad have shown that electronic warfare equipment--and in particular the CMEs--with which the Jaguar is equipped, are deficient, and it is from this realization that the program briefly alluded to above has come into being.

Conclusions

TAC is therefore, in 1980, a satisfactory combat instrument. That does not mean for all that its future poses no problems. Indeed, and this is a question of a problem linked to the growing vulnerability of tactical support aircraft, one may wonder how effective TAC would be confronting a conventional enemy strongly equipped with modern, high-performance anti-aircraft means.

It would be necessary, in the middle term, to improve the aptitude of TAC units to penetrate in a very hostile environment, on the one hand by strongly improving its defensive electronic warfare capacity (scramblers, self-propelling decoys, etc) and, on the other hand, by increasing its anti-radar potential. In order to do this, it would be necessary to develop, as the Americans are doing in this field of microwave guided weapons, an anti-radar saturation munition, of small size, capable of knocking out enemy radar antennae. Likewise, the entry into service of a conventional version of the ASMP would considerably increase the effectiveness of ground attack airplanes.

If improvements remain to be brought to the current generation of material and weapons, one must not for all that neglect the problem of replacing the Mirage III-Es and the Jaguars.

The former will be replaced, it is known, by an air-to-surface version of the Mirage 2000, which will be equipped with ASMP.

The Jaguars, for their part, will be replaced by a new airplane, most likely produced by the tri-national ACT/TKF/ECA program, if however it culminates in something tangible. It is certainly this program which will determine the nature and missions of TAC in the coming century.

Deployment of TAC Units

LES UNITES DE LA FATac

2e E C	1/2 • Cigognes • 2/2 • Côte d'Or • 3/2 • Alsace •	Mirage IIIE.B	BA 102 Dijon
3e E C	1/3 • Navarre • 2/3 • Champagne • 3/3 • Ardennes •	Mirage IIIE Mirage IIIE Jaguar	BA 133 Nancy
4e E C	1/4 • Dauphiné • 2/4 • Lafayette •	Mirage IIIE	BA 116 Luxeuil
7e E C	1/7 • Provence • 2/7 • Argonne • 3/7 • Languedoc • 4/7 • Limousin •	Jaguar	BA 113 Saint Dizier BA 125 (sous en cours de formation)
11e E C	1/11 • Roussillon • 2/11 • Vosges • 3/11 • Corse • 4/11 • Jura •	Jaguar	BA 138 Tour BA 106 Bordeaux
	Mirage IIIE		
13e E C	1/13 • Artois • 2/13 • Alpes • 3/13 • Auvergne •	Mirage 5F	BA 132 Colmar
33e E R	1/33 • Belfort • 2/33 • Savoie • 3/33 • Moselle •	Mirage IIIR Mirage IIIR Mirage IIIRD	BA 124 Strasbourg

Groupement électronique tactique
Groupement de transmissions tactiques
CEVSV / Nancy
CPIR / Luxeuil
Liaison SAR / Metz



Air-to-Surface Attack Planes



The No 24 Jaguar A of the 1/7 "Provence" Squadron. This plane is armed with 68-mm rocket launcher racks. Underneath, a 1,200 liter SECAN ventral drum.

The No 49 Mirage 5F of the 2/13 "Alpes" Squadron. The weaponry includes 2 air-to-air 'Magic' missiles, 6 250-kilogram bombs and a rocket launcher drum (one under each wing). Underneath, a Brandt rocket launcher for 18 68-mm projectiles, and a JL 100 rocket-launcher drum (drum capacity: 280 liters).



The No 513 Mirage IIIE of the 2/3 "Champagne" Squadron, armed with an AS 37 Martel missile under the fuselage and with 2 AIM-9B Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, one under each wing.

Underneath, a non-releasable 500 liter SECAN drum, then a 1,300 liter releasable SECAN drum.

9330
CSO: 3100

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN TO NATO DISCUSSED

Munich BAYERNKURIER in German 19 Jul 80 p 9

[Article by Peter Hornung: "The Kremlin Warns Spain Against Joining NATO"]

[Text] On his lightning visit to Spain U.S. President Carter heard nothing but evasions. Neither the king nor his prime minister were willing to take a definite stand on the question of Spain's joining NATO. Carter urged: "I hope that the Spanish people realize that joining NATO is in their own best interest." Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja did not react to Carter's offer until after the U.S. President's departure. He declared in the Senate: "We have returned to the community of Western democracies and we should also join the defense community of these countries. That would be the last step in ending our isolation.

Some links have already existed between Spain and NATO. As early as 1953 Generalissimo Franco concluded an agreement on bases with the United States which also granted certain special rights to other NATO air forces. The agreement was extended in 1970, in 1975 a "friendship treaty" was concluded which the then U.S. secretary of state, Kissinger, described as a "parallel NATO agreement." This agreement had to be extended the following year and should actually have been followed by the official accession of Spain to NATO. But Franco always kept his distance from NATO. The generalissimo could not be convinced that in case of need an alliance where, for instance, Spanish soldiers would fight side by side with Norwegian soldiers without defending a common interest, would work. The most diverse factions became heirs to Franco's aversion to NATO. Naturally, Franco's old general swear against NATO and are applauded for their stand by their political arch-enemies, Felipe Goncales' socialists, as well as the communists.

These latter-day grave-diggers of the Franco era have been reinforced by the "Socialist International." Willy Brandt too, president of the Socialist International, wishes to give the Kremlin a gift without getting anything in return and is thereby reinforcing the socialists' chief in his animosity to NATO. Breshnev supported his friend from the spring thaw of German Ostpolitik and scoffed in Spain's direction: "Spain's joining the Western aggressive military alliance will further jeopardize peace

in Central Europe." Spanish Prime Minister Suarez reacted cooly: "Spain's best interests are not decided in Moscow but by the Cortes, the parliament. If the Cortes say so than Spain will join NATO."

Spain is a high priority subject for NATO because of its strategic military importance: Spain is the bolt between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In the Canary Islands Spain possesses an advanced base facing the South Atlantic. The Spanish Navy is currently undergoing mondernization. A medium-sized aircraft carrier is under construction to be flanked by four missile-carrying destroyers. A study of the Spanish general staff provides for the operation of a task force including the aircraft carrier between the Canary Islands and Gibraltar as a mobile sea attack force. A combination air and naval base is to be established at Gran Canaria with the base at Rota, constituting the northern limit of operations. This creates a strategic triangle occupying the most important navigational routes controlling the exit from the Meditterranean and the access to the South Atlantic.

NATO air forces hitherto only held guest maneuvers at the Rota and Largies bases in the Azores, with the U.S. Air Force dominant, Now the Spanish Army is looking for closer partnership, but for domestic reasons the Suarez government does not want to play the American card unilaterally. Spanish forces hope to acquire an Atlantic dimension by alliances with the most important Europe . military powers. Franco's legacy faces revision on this point too. As in the case of Portugal Spain is important not so much for its divisions as for its geographic location. Presently Spain offers an army of only 321,000 men with obsolete equipment, only one armored division, two mechanized infantry divisions and the remainder consisting of infantry divisions equipped with World War II weapons: but even a not so well equipped force can render important services off the Spanish coast, exert control over the Atlantic all the way to the Azores and in the southerly direction to the Canary Islands, block the Straits of Gibralter and supervise the Meditterranean at least to the Balearic Islands. Sea battle strategist Admiral Edward Wegener said: "Spain is a turntable which together with Portugal replaces a dozen expensive aircraft carriers."

Spain's importance has increased further as a consequence of the oil crisis. The most important maritime tanker routes from the south converge on its coasts. Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov recognized this; he has stationed battle groups at the intersection of these sea routes, including missile-carrying cruisers capable of blockading Spain in case of war. But Soviet power is engaged in subversion also from land bases by supporting the terrorist Polisario groups in what formerly was Spanish Sahara against the Moroccan Royal Army with the objective of establishing a satellite state at the edge of the Atlantic. While the last African summit conference of the OAU (Organization of African Union) once again blocked recognition of the Polisario state, the Soviet Union's African satellites keep insisting on it. Such recognition would result in war between Algeria and Morocco.

As a member of NATO Spain with its two enclaves on the North African coast could exert a stabilizing influence and prevent war.

Lisbon also wants to contribute by strengthening the strategic triangle between Spain, the Azores and Portugal. Portuguese general staff officers have chosen the small port of Sines, situated 100 kilometers south of Lisbon, as a new base where there are already substantial piers able to accomodate sizable fleets of fishing boats; these facilities could be built up to accomodate missile-carrying ships. Sines is suitable as a base because it has barracks, port facilities and access routes and because the air force base Beja is only 80 kilometers away. Lisbon is within reach for sailor recreation of the NATO fleet. Still, the Spanish general staff views the strategic triangle between the Canary Islands, the Azores and Spain, including bases on the Portuguese mainland, as inadequate. At the height of the Iranian crisis a formation of the American fleet also called on the Moroccan port. The Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla have only piers for small excursion boats and ferries. But the general staff in Madrid declared in self-criticism: "Without Morocco the security of the so-called strategic triangle in southwestern Europe cannot be ensured."

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ESKIMOS IN ALASKA, CANADA, GREENLAND ORGANIZE AT CONGRESS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Aug 80 p 10

[Article by Werner Adam: "The Eskimos Discover Themselves: Self-Rule Takes on Nationalistic Traits in Greenland"]

[Text] After centuries of complete estrangement they are beginning to think of their common origins and even to dream of a sort of confederation: The Eskimos in Greenland, in Canada and Alaska. Representatives of these ethnic groups, who also have some relatives on the other side of the Bering Strait, met not long ago in Greenland's capital Godthaab to revive ties of which no one really knows if and when they actually existed. Nonetheless beyond ethnic roots there are after all linguistic relationships which rather suddenly provide these Mongoloid inhabitants of the North American Arctic with sufficient reason to launch a historical and cultural self-discovery trip.

Because Eskimos do not like to be called such, as the concept is of Indian origin and means "raw meat eaters," in accordance with their own language usage they termed their first "Three-Nation Conference" an Inuit conference and thereby associated with the official name of the Canadian Eskimos, even though Inuit simply means "human being." In Godthaab the conference participants not only displayed astonishing self-awareness and researched not only historical and cultural communal backgrounds, but even unabashedly struck up nationalistic tones. They were intoned principally by the hosts, especially when an "oil sheik" from Alaska, the representative of the autonomous settlement North Slope Borough, intimated the possibility of petrodollar investments for the economic development of Greenland.

The simple suggestion of financial support inspired the Greenland conference participants to such an extent that they proudly disclosed to their guests from Alaska and Canada that they would in the future really like to terminate the membership of their Arctic island in the European community. In 1972 Greenland was drawn into the Common Market in the wake of its "mother country" Denmark, although at that time about 70 percent of the Greenlanders had spoken out in a referendum against

such a membership. In May of last year the Danish crown granted its polar province self-rule, which then led to the domination of the left-national Siumut Party since then in the administration and the legislature. This party had made it its goal to remove Greenland from the European community and to organize a referendum by 1982 at the latest for this purpose.

The Siumut politician, Finn Lynge, who represents Greenland in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, is one of the most vehement Common Market opponents. The fact that his homeland, besides development credits, receives about 90 million Danish kroner of direct aid a year from the Common Market till in Brussels does not appear to him to be important enough to stick to a community "which denies us Greenlanders the right to self-determination of our fishing policy." Although the catch quotas established by the Common Market allow the Greenlanders themselves unlimited fishing in Greenland's waters, Lynge together with the Siumut Party wants Greenland to be sole master over its 200-mile zone.

Lynge believes that the financial losses associated with leaving the Common Market can be made up by tapping other sources, as he now made clear. Not that Denmark, which is in debt up to its ears, should be bled more heavily, but the Siumut government wants to collect so-called license fees from the trawlers of foreign shipping companies. It is also conceivable that the shipping companies could be buttonholed into investing in Greenland. Finally, a third possibility might be to make purchases from these shipping companies or to acquire more ships oneself in order to expand one's own fishing industry in this way. The opposition Atassut Party, of a conservative complexion, retorts to the delegate Lynge that it is absurd to throw oneself into the arms of the heavy capital "multis" instead of remaining in the European community. Besides, Greenland will never be in a position on its own to police its waters adequately to collect the catch fees. Nonetheless nationalistic tones seem to find stronger echo, for Greenland experts in Copenhagen are also of the opinion that at another referendum the majority will once again speak out against the European community.

Greenland's government under Prime Minister Motzfeldt, chairman of the Siumut Party, basically goes beyong this and makes claims which explode the framework of self-rule, because Denmark has in no way granted its distant province with its barely 50 thousand inhabitants even a participatory say in questions of foreign and defense policy. Motzfeldt considers demanding rent from the United States for its military bases in Thule and Soendre Stroemfjord and to seek a special representation in the Northern Council. Beyond this, the minister for economics, Johansen, speaks in the future of treating the Danes in Greenland seeking employment like foreigners.

Even the vote of the Greenlanders for self-rule was perceived by Siumut supporters as only a partial success and at that time, in January 1979, they openly sang on the streets of Godthaab in the image of the murdered American civil rights leader Martin Luther King: "We shall overcome." And foreign journalists were told by Finn Lynge, at that time still director of Radio Greenland, that Greenlanders did not feel bound to Europe but to "their kind" in Canada and Alaska.

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FLEMISH SOCIALISM UNDER VAN MIERT ANALYZED

SP Increasingly Active

Brussels LE SOIR in French 5 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Guy Duplat: "Flemish Socialists Under Van Miert Switch From Pragmatic Analysis to Radical Action"]

> [Text] A new wind has been blowing in our world of politics for several years now; it is the wind of the Flemish socialists. The old party of Messrs Van Eynde, Van Acker, and Spinoy, somewhat sclerotic, still functioning thanks to the glory of some great foresighted men, has been swamped by a new political wave. Young men have appeared following Willy Claes; Van Miert, Tobback, and Willockx have contributed new themes to the political discussion: missiles, Zaire, real estate speculation, the medical association, the quality of life. These are the young cadres of a new, dynamic socialism, close to the Dutch and German Social Democratic parties and they are showing that prosperity and the improvement of living conditions are not the death-knell of socialism--on the contrary. In a postindustrial world, socialism has the duty of asking itself some questions as to the foundation of society. The windows of the bold doctrinaire party have suddenly been opened: the young men, the Christians, and the women have come to the fore. The right of tendencies has been recognized. This is no longer the "good" or "treacherous" Flemish Socialist Party.

The results of this policy are beginning to emerge on the electoral level. The slow decline of the Flemish socialists since the war has been checked. They had dropped from 29 percent after the war to 20 percent during the 1978 elections. In 1979, during the European elections, they climbed back up again for the first time, rather weakly, to be sure, but, as Mr Tobback

said, the party, doomed to continual decline, became a party for the future. The young party chairman Van Miert was able to win a big personal victory with close to 300,000 votes. The "Van Miert effect" became quite evident; it is made up of a direct, relaxed, charming and real style.

During those same European elections, the French-speaking socialists--who had not cleaned the old socialist shop out in this democratic fashion--suffered a rather bitter defeat, losing 5.72 percent of the vote.

In spite of the very strongly Flemish positions of Mr Van Miert, his charisma seems to go beyond the language border; French-speaking young people and intellectuals have the impression that there is a political debate springing from the rut of powerlessness not only among the Flemish socialists.

The phenomenon of the newspaper DE MORGEN is tied to this renewal movement and is very interesting in this context. Creating a left-wing newspaper, independent of the Socialist Party and making it work was a big job which the team of Paul Goossens accomplished successfully at the very moment when the French-speaking socialist newspaper LE PEUPLE died under the candle snuffer of a socialist apparatus that was entirely too powerful.

How did they put together that party which, as its chairman Van Miert said, in quoting Mr Dehousse, is "radically" implementing a moderate program rather than a radical program in a moderate fashion." A party close to the Dutch and German socialists, an internationalist party, concerned with the quality of life.

What is that party which persons frightened by this new spirit refer to as the "seducer of Mr Simonet," that party which does not hesitate accuse Mobutu, the new minister Hatry, the "Eurosystem," and even the royal family?

A "Strong and United" Party

To understand it, one must go back to the old "strong and united" party--the Belgian socialists.

The party remained united for longer than any other party. The Flemish socialists benefitted from the support of their big Walloon brother.

The great leaders had built themselves electoral and government fiefs. As Mr Tobback said, the socialist presence was almost obligatory in the administration; the less socialist leaders there were, the more did they have a chance of becoming ministers.

After the glory of the Liberation, the Flemish socialists had gradually become a party of mandarins and local potentates.

It proved to be incapable of responding to the great changes that stirred Flemish society after the war: the search for cultural autonomy, the social character of language demands, the events of May 1968, and the demands of the women and the young people.

Internal democracy within the party was quite weak. When the boss said so, discussion was closed. To get into the party, one had to show one's credentials. From birth onward, one had to be affiliated with the socialist insurance company and in the cradle one must already have played with the party newspaper VOLKSGAZET, etc. The Christians had to make sure that they were being blessed with very red water. And this was barely a cartoonist's view of things as they were. "In 1945, all Flemish artists were socialists but 20 years later not a one of them is left," Mr Tobback recalls.

The only tactic was an alliance with the labor unions and "beefsteak socialism" so dear to Mr Anseele. But between the big demands and administrative action, in government, full of compromise, there was room for disenchantment and loss of credibility. The young people, who had not had an opportunity to participate in the party, were disabused.

Willy Claes, the premier, understood the situation and worked to revitalize the party. This change came about a little bit by chance. In 1971 there were no longer any foresighted men in Limbourg. The local leader, Mr. Thys, had died prematurely. In facing this vacuum, the party turned toward the very young Willy Claes who was very active within the socialist insurance companies. Mr Claes' action was decisive.

He became minister of national education and then co-chairman of the still united party; in so doing, Mr Claes opened the party's doors to the young people and speeded up the split of the Socialist Party.

Things became clear during the discussions in Egmont Palace concerning the establishment of the Tindemans II administration.

Mr Claes openly adopted the Flemish positions. This sort of thing had been a supreme crime until then but he did support Volksunie and he demanded the participation, in the government, of the Federalist Party, until then considered the party of the right wing, the party of the "collaborators."

The social character of Flemish demands was finally recognized by the Flemish socialists.

A common Flemish front was formed and Mr Claes openly opposed Mr Cools.

He then became minister of economic affairs in the Tindemans II cabinet, a position which he kept holding thereafter. He imposed a new chairman upon the party, a young, 35-year-old man, unknown among the party bigwigs, a many by the name of Karel Van Miert.

In the next article we will see how this appointment swept the party along into a second wave of renewal.

Mr Claes himself sometimes has trouble today recognizing his child.

SP Leftist But Open to Christians

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Guy Duplat: "Flemish Socialists Under Van Miert Switching From Pragmatic Analysis to Radical Action"]

> [Text] Within just a few years, the Flemish socialists (SP [Socialist Party]) managed completely to revitalize their image among public opinion. The fresh wind which they made blow in Belgian politics is made up of new topics, such as Zaire or the missiles, but there is also a contribution from the younger generation and from idealism. The young socialists however do not seem to be the dangerous "Saint-Just" people attacked by certain quarters; they also worked toward the internal democratization of their party, as witnessed by the intensity of discussions within the SP and its opening toward other philosophical currents. The first renewal wave was the work of Mr Claes and the second one was the work of Mr Van Miert.

His election to the chairmanship of the Flemish socialists on 28 June 1977 was a surprise.

Karel Van Miert was born at Oud-Turnhout in Limbourg on 17 January 1942 into a family of Catholic farmers. The oldest of nine children, he kept winning first place in school. But he was forced to drop out at the age of 17 to start as an electrician's apprentice in a building firm. He discovered the social struggle and the all-powerful position of the Catholic Church.

Later he was able to resume his studies and he obtained a degree in diplomatic studies at the University of Ghent; he obtained a postgraduate degree in higher European studies at the European University Center of Nancy. Speaking fluent French, English, and German, he took advanced courses at various foreign universities.

In the EEC, he worked with Mr Mansholt and then with Mr Simonet, whose office manager he was. He participated in the creation of "Rode Leeuwen" the "Red Lions" of Brussels, the first to have introduced the language debate among the Flemish socialists.

He was chairman of the "Young Socialists" from 1970 until 1972 and after that he became political secretary of the party until 1973; he also was deputy national secretary from 1976 until 1977. He got his broken nose from boxing, not from politics.

The election of an almost unknown young man of Catholic origin was surprising, to say the least.

Right after his election, Mr Van Miert revealed a characteristic which he never abandoned thereafter.

He wants a more radical but pragmatic and nonrevolutionary party, an open party, not a ghetto, more Flemish and more attractive to the young people and the women. He denounced the party's profiteers, those who kept accumulating offices. He promised "clean" politics. He does not want any more Anseele--Baudrin affairs. Finally, the moment he took over, he realized the importance of the right of tendencies.

A Realistic Worker

For Paul Goossens, of MORGEN, Mr Van Miert is not a traditional politician. Attracted by the Dutch example of the worker party (the PVDA), he was highly familiar with foreign policy and all of the experience of socialism in Europe. "Karl Van Miert is not obsessed with foreign policy," said Paul Goossens. "He is swept along by a certain measure of dash and daring." He analyzes case folders the way a bank manager would do, with discussion, but when action seems indispensible to him, he goes all the way.

He is a man who has it all together. He was in Prague in 1968, during the invasion by Soviet forces. He always thereafter refused to meet with any Czechoslovak officials. He does not want any further contacts with Zaire so long as human rights are not respected there. This stubborn attitude did not always please the socialists Claes and Simonet who wanted to protect Belgian interests in Zaire.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan, Mr Van Miert has been refusing any conversations with Russian officials. "I have a horror of having to deal with ready-made formulas," declared Mr Van Miert. "I am very specific. I want to stick close to reality. You have to do what you say and you have to say what you are going to do. Let each man say what he thinks rather than fly somewhere up in the clouds."

The moment he came to head the Socialist Party, Mr Van Miert adopted very strongly Flemish positions which became manifest during the discussions in Stuyvengerg Castle. Until then, the Flemish socialists had been deaf to the major demands of the Flemish movement. The long-term leaders had still grown up amid French culture and in the spirit of a united Belgium. The young ones, educated in Flemish, saw that the social struggle in Flanders was tied to a fight for the recognition of their language.

On the other hand, the Flemish socialists had lost many votes in connection with the issue of the Community. The CVP [Social Christian Party] and Volksunie had monopolized Flemish demands. The time had come to make up for lost time. The Flemish socialists however were never obsessed with the language aspect. We recall the outbursts of their leader in the Senate, Mr Wijninckx, who during the latest government crisis declared that he had enough of the CVP and its way of over doing things.

The increasingly Flemish and social democratic character of the party of Mr Van Miert made the split of the Socialist Party inevitable in October 1978.

A Breakthrough

Going back to an idea of the Dutch socialists, the SP (Socialist Party) in 1979 launched the "doorbraak" manifesto--meaning "breakthrough." This was an appeal to progressive Christians, a "remake" of the appeal to rally the progressives launched by former Socialist Party chairman Collard.

But this appeal was presented in an entirely different spirit. This was not just a matter of kicking out a few "left-wing" CVP members of parliament, who felt ill at ease in that party which maintained a certain degree of "softness" in economic and social terms. Although men such as Tijl Declercq, a left-wing CVP deputy, proved to be interested in the renewal of the Socialist Party, this attempt was doomed to fail.

The opening toward the Christians manifested itself among the grass roots. Pluralist meetings were organized. At Louvain, professors from the very Catholic KUL [Catholic University of Louvain] participated in these discussions. A magazine entitled DOORBRAAK reprinted pieces written by socialists and Christians. Fr Ulburghs, of Genk, who worked among the immigrants, for example wrote an article in that magazine. Mr Van Miert himself declared himself to be in favor of a pluralist school.

In Holland, this opening went so far that a monk became a member of the Socialist Party's leading bodies.

This "breakthrough" was indispensible in a Flanders marked profoundly by religion, although a religion which for quite some time has undoubtedly been more open and more progressive than in Wallonia.

Crucial Political Problems

Brussels LE SOIR in French 8 Jul 80 p2

[Article by Guy Duplat: "Flemish Socialists Under Van Miert Switching From Pragmatic Analysis to Radical Action"]

[Text] The Flemish Socialist Party, the SP, has introduced new subjects for thought and action into our political world: missiles, Zaire, police files, a new set up for the medical establishment, real estate speculation--all parts of our world of political habits.

In the missile affair, the Flemish socialists have the impression that the installation, in Belgium, of so-called "theater" nuclear weapons would not make it possible to resume the discussion on disarmament with the Soviets.

"Far from forcing them to negotiate, we would only trigger a new escalation on their part," says Mr Van Miert. "They would install new SS-20 missiles in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. Why, then, not try to start a de-escalation and discuss with them a parallel reduction of nuclear arms?"

For the SP, the risks of nuclear war are real and Belgium would be the first victim of it. The only way to avoid catastrophe--he says--is to try to renew a difficult dialogue. But the Flemish socialists also say that Belgium must remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance and that, if contacts with the Russians turn out entirely negative, it will be necessary to decide to install those arms.

In the case of missiles, as in other cases, the Flemish socialists do not want to be the playthings of the "pro-American" or militarist lobbies.

They want a real debate to be launched on these issues and they do not want Belgium any longer to be the country that says "yes" without discussing any of the demands by NATO military leaders.

The discussion on the installation of missiles has been dramatic within the Flemish Socialist Party. It had asked that any decision on this matter be held up for 2 years (as the Dutch had done). But to prevent a serious political crisis and under pressure from Mr Claes, the Flemish socialists agreed to the construction of these missiles and to a moratorium of only 6 months for the decision as to their installation.

This about-face very seriously disturbed a party which had preached agreement between its ideas and its actions. But this controversy in itself is a sign of internal democracy and renewal within the party. The French-speaking brother, the PS, had also demanded a moratorium against the advice and opinion of Mr Simonet but it abruptly backed away from that decision, apparently without internal debate and without credibility problems.

Political Debates

Zaire is another subject; the Flemish socialists demanded a debate on Belgian policy in Zaire. They do not want that policy to be decided in the hallways

of the ministries, under the pressure-as they say--of a pro-Zaire business lobby.

"Belgian policy in this matter must be the subject of a democratic debate."

This Third World aspect, this concern with human rights, is another feature of the SP and a part of the heritage of the great idealistic movement of the sixties. The demand for a debate on arms sales is another piece of evidence in support of this desire to discuss in public those problems which in the past were concealed for the sake of political realism.

Domestically, the SP has attacked big pensions, the files being kept by the police, the use of information science, and tax fraud.

The SP is preparing a congress on health policy; it has attacked the Medical Association and it is demanding that the latter be dissolved; it preaches free medicine and supports the medical care homes. Its policy on this issue is close to that of the GERM (Research Group for a Reform in Medicine).

The SP has fought for a land policy which would prevent real estate speculation and for subsidized housing.

In economic terms, the SP is rather little dogmatic. It does not believe much in the welfare role of the government and the importance of structural reforms. The time is not right for new demands, it says, but rather for the defense of social gains. The presence of Mr Claes at the head of the Ministry of Economic Affairs undoubtedly prevents the SP from having much elbow room in economic matters.

Mr Van Miert of course defends himself against that. It is true that, since he came to power, the life of the party and the life of the government constitute quite different subjects. The party can criticize the action of the administration and of the socialist ministers. But the importance of Mr Claes and his role as father of the new SP undoubtedly interfere with and stifle those who want to raise these issues all over again. Some Flemish socialists nevertheless do criticize Mr Claes and refer to him as a "simple crisis manager." It is evident that the presence of the liberals in the administration makes the economic silence of the SP even more difficult.

The Party's Conscience

The newspaper DE MORGEN is a little bit the conscience of the party. It introduces new discussion topics. "But it is not a party newspaper," recalls its editor-in-chief Paul Goossens. "We obtained editorial and personnel independence; I am not a member of the SP."

The history of DE MORGEN is intimately tied to Flemish socialist renewal. The old socialist newspaper VOLKSGAZET had failed. Mr Van Miert then

fought to recreate another newspaper which would be open and independent of the party.

The joint-action money suppliers (the labor unions and the insurance companies) of course snorted and sniffed but Mr Van Miert did win out for the cause.

As editor-in-chief he picked Paul Goossens who was only 35 years old and who had been a former student leader of the May 1968 challenge as well as a former economic editor with STANDAARD. Just a year and a half after its creation, the wager on DE MORGEN seems to have been won.

It now has a circulation of more than 50,000 and has gained its place as an opinion journal. The former leaders of VOLKSGAZET do not always turn up again here and are turning toward other newspapers but there is a new public coming to read DE MORGEN. "This newspaper has a great future," says Mr Tobback.

The March SP congress wrote the desire for a wide-open approach into the party's charter: the young people and the women are stepping up their push, the accumulation of offices has been outlawed, the term "class struggle" has been dropped.

It seems that this rapid change in direction by the Flemish Socialist Party is irreversible. The current leaders have the task of not cutting themselves off from the old ones: Piet Vermeylen, Jos Van Eynde, and Louis Major are still in the party bureau. In the office of Karl Van Miert one can see the portraits of glorious socialists such as Achille Van Acker, Camille Huysmans, and once again Louis Major. But many districts are still run by former office holders who do not believe in this new socialism. They consider it to be a vision of intellectuals which is not profitable from the electoral viewpoint.

The decisive test will come during the next elections. If the Flemish socialists confirm their realinement, then the policy of Mr Van Miert can continue but if the party suffers a defeat, internal tensions could come back to life.

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GOVERNMENT'S 5-YEAR AID PLAN FOR BENELUX TEXTILE INDUSTRY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 5 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by pmr: "Official Crutches for the Benelux Textile Industry"]

[Text] Brussels, 1 August--The Belgian Government has ratified an aid plan for the textile and clothing industries which will pump subsidies in the amount of around 35 billion francs to the suffering branches within the next 5 years. The plan calls for the creation of a "Belgian Institute for Textiles and Ready-To-Wear Apparel," which is to assist the more than 4,000 small and medium-sized operations in their management, design, market analysis, sales and research operations and is to be financed by a duty of 0.8 percent on imports from countries outside of the EEC. Furthermore, the textile companies can receive low interest loans or shares in risk capital for strengthening their capital base. But any assistance for any individual company exceeding 150 million francs is subject to a special decision of the cabinet.

Slow Down in Structural Change

The government in Brussels hopes to be able to save around 20,000 jobs with its plan in the coming 5 years. According to an analysis by the Ministry of Economics, by 1985 at least 40,000 of the current 120,000 employed in this branch would lose their jobs without any assistance measures. Since 1973, 45,000 jobs have already disappeared--more than 80 percent of these jobs were held by women. The volume of production decreased by 30 percent in the textile industry and by 24 percent in the ready-to-wear apparel industry. Despite this, this industry, based upon the old tradition of Flanders cloth and lace, still maintains that it is one of the most important industries in the Belgian economy. In 1979, it still contributed 8 percent of the total gross national product and provided a trade surplus of 15 billion francs with a total export value of 123 billion francs.

The decline of the textile and clothing industry is not alone a Belgian problem. The growing import pressure from low-wage countries with stagnating consumer demand creates difficulties for the branch in all countries

of the European Community. But in a comparison of European countries, except for Holland, no country does as poorly as Belgium. Whereas an EEC average of 22 percent of the jobs were lost in the textile industry between the years of 1973 and 1978, in Belgium, 35 percent of these jobs were lost. The high export dependency, the composition of the assortment as well as the small size of the companies--two-thirds of the textile factories employ less than 50 workers--were given as the explanation for this reduction. The government wants to alleviate these structural weakpoints with its emergency plan.

Holland's Bad Example

Critics of the textile plan, however, fear that the billions of the taxpayers' money will mainly flow to the suffering companies and that will just complicate matters for the healthy companies. Therefore they plead for a general improvement in the climate for investments by cutting back on social programs and by reducing the interest rates in the capital market.

The neighboring country of Holland provided a bad example for Belgium a few years ago. There, the demise of this branch is embellished in a series of more or less imaginative names. Wolcon, Sigmacon, Strucon stand for foundations, working committees and company conglomerates which were all kept alive with government funds and most often ended in complete disaster. In 1974, Sigmacon was established for the wool industry and was supposed to bring together all the viable companies in this branch. Four years later, the Dutch government accounting office established that 65 million guilders spent on the project did not have any useful effect at all, but rather, on the contrary, mismanaged a previously healthy operation. The Strucon foundation established in 1975 for the clothing industry did not do much better, even after spending around 90 million guilders.

Between 1968 and 1978, the number of jobs in the Dutch textile and clothing industry decreased from 155,000 to almost 58,000. But this branch does not have the same position in the Dutch economy as does the Belgian textile and clothing industry in Belgium. Its rate of production stagnated for years between 6 and 7 billion guilders, about 3 percent of the gross national product. Last year it contributed a trade deficit of close to a billion guilders. Because the textile factories are concentrated in structurally weak regions such as along the border to Germany, for example Twente, the state felt itself compelled to intervene on a massive scale. Despite this, between 1968 and 1978, 62 percent of the jobs in the textile and clothing sector disappeared in Holland whereas the EEC average was only 13 percent.

Uncontrolled Mismanagement?

The high salaries and the hard guilders were given as reasons for this situation in Holland. In addition, the clothing industry complained of the policy of commission processing in Eastern bloc and Mediterranean countries

or in the Far East as practiced by the large department stores. The most dangerous competition to the Dutch textile factories and clothing companies, however, are not the inexpensive mass manufacturers but rather the European neighbors, most of all the West Germans, who transport very fashionable and expensive articles across the border with increasing success.

Economics Minister Van Aardenne already criticized the domestic branch a year and a half ago, saying that it would fall due to its inflexibility and increativity. The trade unions talk openly about the "mismanagement of the textile barons." They demand more and more government intervention and increased injections of capital as cures. But the liberal economics minister is trying to cut back on aid to individual, flailing companies which received massive subsidies under his predecessor. Without doing anything, he has looked on as companies which previously received millions in subsidies had to close their gates. He did not lend an ear to the vehement complaints by trade unionists and managers for pumping in just a little more money to save hundreds of jobs. The future of the textile industry, according to Van Aardenne's creed, will be determined by the development of the market and not by government intervention.

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CSO: 3103

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS REPORTED

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 17 Jul 80 p 5

/Conversation with Agriculture Ministry Director General A. Papasolomondos/

/Text/ A sweeping multi-purpose plan designed to change the face of Cypriot farming and assure the necessary support and rehabilitation of our farmers and livestock breeders will be put into effect and will be implemented during the next 10 years provided the related projects which are being planned by the Ministry of Agriculture are finally implemented and financed.

TA NEA has obtained this information from a reliable source. These inspired and ambitious plans provide for the following:

1. The irrigation of the tremendous farm zone on the southern coast between the town of Khrysokhous to the west and the town of Xylofagou in the southeastern part of the island, in a series of interconnected dams which will distribute water to the farms throughout the area.

2. The development of a new zone in the less developed and economically hard-pressed area of Pitsilias, with a farm development project which has already started. The plan will affect 49 villages in the Pitsilias area, the mountainous area in the center of Cyprus with some 21,000 inhabitants who will benefit directly from this project.

3. The granting of short-term and medium-term loans totaling 3 to 4 million Cypriot pounds to livestock breeders to help them expand their flocks to economically more viable levels. This plan which is oriented toward those who raise sheep, goats or cows depends on the ability to the ministry to secure the necessary funds to finance these loans.

There is one thing certain according to Andreas Papasolomondos, the general director of the Agriculture and Natural Resources Ministry, who discussed these plans with one of our reporters: "Within the next 10 years we are certain to develop all the important surface water resources in Cyprus by constructing dams on all major rivers." Papasolomondos estimated that these dams will utilize one third of the annual rainfall.

Related to this tremendous project are three other major and related projects which are already underway. These are the project for the irrigation of Pafos based on the construction of the Asprokremmos dam; the Vasilikos-Pendaskhino project, near Zygi at the Kalavasos and Dymopotamos River--which will be completed in 5 years and will irrigate 8,900 stremmas while at the same time meeting certain needs for running water in the areas of Nicosia, Larnaca and Famagusta; third, the construction of 2 dams and 20 reservoirs or "lakes" in Pitsilias which together with other related projects are designed to raise the area's standard of living by developing the area's resources and by improving the social services.

Also under study is another ambitious project--the construction of a dam on the Kourri River near Alassa on the Platrai-Limassol highway which will be the biggest in Cyprus, capable of irrigating 56,000 stremmas and, by using water pipes 112 kilometers in total length, will take water to remote Kokkinokhoria in the southeastern part of the island. If it is eventually built, its cost will reach 80 million pounds, according to the 1980 budget.

The study will be completed next year and if implemented will "dam up" the only "river of some significance that has been left in the southern, free section of Cyprus," to quote Papasolomondos.

The proposed dam with an annual inflow of 65 million cubic meters of water, but with a capacity reaching 100 million cubic meters, will bring water enough for housekeeping needs to Nicosia and Larnaca to satisfy their needs for the next century.

The ministry has also turned its attention to the Polis in the Pafos District. "It is not right to say that we are neglecting the Polis (Khrysokhou) area"--to quote Papasolomondos--which in his view is "ripe for development."

There is already under current study the development of the entire area with the implementation of modern irrigation projects including the construction of dams and the use of a certain number of artesian wells. In this way we will develop approximately 30,000 stremmas of irrigated land.

Papasolomondos added: "There is indeed first-class soil there, the production is early and the climate mild. If it is approved, the construction of the dam will start in 1984 and the entire project could be completed in 5 years. It would cost between 25 and 40 million pounds depending on the population." He explained that most of the projects we mentioned depend by 60 percent on foreign exchange and "inflation is a serious problem when one tries to determine the ultimate cost of a project." He added that another area under close scrutiny for potential development is possibly that of Marathasa.

Papasolomondos believes that the trend is to make agriculture in Cyprus an auxiliary occupation--already only 5 percent of the population is exclusively working in agriculture.

"But," he went on, "if we give to the farmers the elementary means for a comfortable life and adequate means of transportation, I think they will stay in their villages. And why should we not set up farm industries in agricultural area if certain villages are far away from the main employment centers?"

"In one area which is under development," Papasolomondos continued, "we have plans to construct a model cheese factory." He further believes that there is a need to improve the present methods for the marketing of milk and that "milk should be channeled to the market through a distribution board."

Generally speaking, "although there is a limit as to what we can do to solve the problem of human and economic resources" with regard to those tremendous development plans, Papasolomondos has confidence in "the intelligence of the Cypriot people who are flexible and receptive."

"Although the future status of Cyprus in the European Economic Community is still unknown, a fact which hinders planning, we cannot sit and wait," he concluded. "We may find openings in the market; we must continue the rate of development. Taking into account the limitations of the market and the necessary adjustments, I think we can succeed."

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CSO:4908

LIBERAL MP: SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT STYMIED BY OWN POLICY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 80 p 8

[By Peter Brixtofte, MP (Liberal)]

[Text] Of all the countries in the European Common Market, Denmark is the one in which general malaise is most prevalent. This is demonstrated by a Gallup poll printed in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on 8 July.

This malaise is understandable, and we danes will certainly have to live through more bad times before optimism will be able to gain a foothold again. But there is hope ahead.

It is not surprising that the population is pessimistic, in this period of pessimism within the government. The government gave up hope long ago of solving our problems. The government merely tries to survive. I don't hold this position simply because I belong to an opposing party. My position can be proven by the fact that the government presently says that there is no reason to take action, even though all the economic evaluations indicate that our problems are growing more serious day by day.

It is also quite difficult for many of us to understand why a nation's crucially important energy policy, for example, should be administered so chaotically and amateurishly, as is the case here in Denmark. One is tempted to say that Denmark today is totally without political leadership.

All this, of course, is not happening because the government consists of persons who don't want to do the best they can for Denmark. There can be no doubt that the prime minister and his cabinet are doing their best.

The problem is, however, that the ideology currently prevalent in the governing party prevents the government from doing what Denmark needs.

Denmark needs to have the work force earning more money. Denmark needs to be able to make it pay to invest in the work force.

If it were profitable to invest in the work force, we would have more production and more activity. The deficit would be less, and unemployment would decrease.

The government knows all this very well. But the government's ideology prohibits that the work force earn more money through investments.

For this reason, the government proposes either OD [Economic Democracy] or more taxation. Because surely the work force needs to increase productivity somewhat--but it should be the workers themselves, or society at large, who receive the profits.

In other words, the profits shouldn't go to those who will be deciding whether the investments should be increased.

We saw in December how our income policy was destroyed because OD could not be carried out. We saw extra taxes being levied on stockholders, on agriculture, on assets. In every case the work force suffered, because it was thought that the elimination of hard-times portions would relieve the work force by lessening costs. And this loss would of course be absorbed in turn.

It is absolutely necessary that the income of the work force be increased, even if the wage-earners have to tighten their belts in the first round. If this does not happen, productivity will not increase. This redistribution of funds, however, is offensive to the Social Democratic philosophy. And for this reason, our problems remain unsolved.

One could actually conclude that Social Democracy in Denmark has no ideological possibilities for stimulating production. And so we can see at present that the government will have to resort to higher and higher taxes, in order to avoid deficits and to economize us out of our problems.

However, that is an impossible task. Denmark imports so many raw materials and so much oil, etc., that general consumer goods are not of decisive importance. Today's figures are so drastic that we actually would have to eliminate all importation of coffee, tea, automobiles, bananas, etc., if we want to get rid of the deficit.

The higher taxes also cause decreased motivation to work, and decreases in domestic demand. They lead to more unemployment and lessened production.

Since the government, for ideological reasons, cannot stimulate production, and since it is hopeless to try to bring consumption down sufficiently, the situation is hopeless. At least, as it appears today. The population understands this.

But how can we come out of this hopelessness? There are two possibilities. Either the government must go against its ideological principles and come to some kind of agreement with the Liberals and the conservatives; or the country will have to wait until we get a liberal-bourgeois government.

We can hope for the first possibility; the second we will have to wait a while for, as things stand. There are many who think that the political Gallup figures are also hopeless. Social Democracy does not look far enough into the past, and the Liberals and the conservatives don't look far enough into the future. An election wouldn't set enough votes in motion, they say. It wouldn't be sufficient. If the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE's Gallup figures from Sunday, 6 July, could be changed into parliamentary seats, the political situation would be much more fruitful.

A decline in popularity for Social Democracy and the small coalition parties would lead to the Social Democrats' being unable to form coalitions without including either the left-wing elements or the Liberal party plus the conservatives.

If the Social Democrats chose to use the radical parties, then it would be a short-lived affair. In 1967 and also in December 1979, the Socialist People's Party revealed that it wanted to split very quickly into two parties, if it was to be included in a coalition with the Social Democrats and (for example) the Radicals plus another little party. Besides this, the election figures from 1968 and 1973 showed that such an alliance can cost the Social Democrats quite a lot in terms of votes.

For this reason, the Social Democrats would be coerced immediately, or right after an election, to grant key positions to the Liberals and the conservatives, as necessary parties in the coalition, or else to hand over the government to them entirely.

Although the Gallup analysis of our belief in the future reveals our lack of hope, there is hope to be found in the political Gallup poll. This hope will, of course, grow along with the growing number of votes which will be brought over from the Social Democrats to the Liberals and the conservatives. So there are no grounds for hopelessness in the long run. The population itself will control how long the hopelessness will continue.

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CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

ENERGY INVESTMENT PACKAGE--Approximately 1 billion Danish kroner will be invested over a series of several years in construction for longterm energy projects, Energy Minister Poul Nielson says. But he cannot give his approval to a billion-kroner investment covering a perfof of 1 year. The Energy Minister's stand on this issue stems from his reply to MP Ole Kalnaes (Socialist People's Party), who asked for an explanation of the effects of an investment of this size on expenses for unemployment support. The Energy Minister calculates that approximately half of the state subsidy of 25 percent for the construction of longterm energy projects could be saved by means of decreased unemployment support. But he considers it impossible to efficiently invest a billion kroner in a project of this kind over the course of one year. By stretching out the investment over a series of several years, mass production, increased profitability and regularity of production are increased, he claims. He added that the most important thing to do is to make plans for longterm energy for the parts of the country which don't receive natural gas or artificial heat from powerplants. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Jul 80 p 1] 9584

CSO: 3106

CLIMATE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE NOT SEEN AS HELPING CDU/CSU

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by Fritz Ullrich Fack: "The Most Difficult Election Campaign for the Union"]

[Text] An oddly diffuse feeling is spreading across the land which can be traced to the federal elections on 5 October. If one draws on the most recent opinion polls, the political scene is overshadowed by apprehensions and skepticism about the future, by a certain degree of perplexity, by strange, contradictory attitudes hardly making any sense, and by a predominant desire for peace, the other side of the coin of which is a fear of war.

Assuring peace has overtaken the primary position today of all political priorities even ahead of the popular issues of price stability and old age pension guarantees. These are at least the findings of a massive series of opinion polls conducted in mid-June by the Allensbacher Institute. Simultaneously, in comparision with the last federal elections in 1976, the percentage of those wanting to pursue detente with the Eastern bloc in order to solidify good relations has increased (from 29 to 33 percent). And there are even fewer who are saying: No more compromises with the East without equivalent reciprocity (from 52 to 49 percent). But simultaneously, an obviously larger number of citizens would like to see a stronger NATO (from 40 to 47 percent) or would like to have better defenses in the event of a military attack (from 51 to 60 percent). But they also know--and this is what makes the political feelings so diffuse--that the prospects for this are grim: Only 30 percent (in comparison with a previous 36 percent) view this as being achievable. A majority of 57 percent of those polled expressed apprehension and doubt about the coming decade; only 37 percent view the future with a certain degree of hopefulness.

The policy of detente continues to disperse its old magic in the thoughts of those polled, even more so after Afghanistan; 77 percent voted for its continuation in June. Only the Union supports appeared to be somewhat skeptical, with only 65 percent expressing this view, whereas supporters of

the two coalition parties reached figures of around 90 percent. Two-thirds of the population also believe that the West and the Soviet Union will coexist peacefully with each other over the long run.

One of the most astounding figures coming from the Allensbacher polls concerns the attitude towards reunification on the basis of the following model: neutralization of Germany, continuing nonaligned status (withdrawal from NATO and the Warsaw Pact), free elections. It is true that three of every four asked do not see any real chances of implementation of this and view the plan as being unrealistic. But it is notable as well how they vote in the light of this irreality: 49 percent said they would be in favor at the end of 1979 (in comparison with 38 percent the year before) if this model could be realized.

The Allensbacher poll also provided some indications for the advancement of the social-liberal attitudes. Compared with 1976, in June of 1980 only 44 percent (previously 51 percent) were still in favor of the demand: "No radicals in the civil service." It is also encouraging that when given the alternative between "freedom" and "as great a degree of equality as possible," 57 percent of those polled favored freedom; but in 1976, 61 percent were in favor of freedom. Basic conservative attitudes still carry their weight but they are crumbling at the edges, especially in the younger generations. Among the young, the trend toward "progressive positions" has been strongest of all within the past few years; the new material provides much evidence to support this.

These are the outlines of a state of consciousness which the parties will confront in the elections on 5 October. Undoubtedly, the choice between Schmidt and Strauss will play an important role for the outcome of the elections. But it must be realized that the Union also has to combat a new state of consciousness in the people which has not changed in their favor: The Union has to fight against resignation and fear, against the underlying "better red than dead" attitude, against a bundle of heterogeneous fears of the future, against the ostrich mentality in foreign policy, against semi-disguised revivals of neutralism. With the exception of the state debt, which 62 percent of the population consider to be too high, there is no single issue which could put wind into the Union sails. Even in response to the question, who would handle all the economic difficulties better, 51 percent of those polled chose Schmidt with only 31 percent in favor of Strauss. This is astonishing.

In this climate permeated with apprehension and the desire for peace, Strauss--regardless of all the other handicaps--comes across like the political Anti-Christ. Sixty-eight percent of those polled expect greater conflict among the parties under his rule; 55 percent expect greater tensions with the trade unions; 50 percent expect a poorer relationship with the East, especially with the Soviet Union (45 percent); 42 percent expect greater unrest at the universities; and 30 percent expect more strikes.

Accordingly, the prejudgment of large portions of the population, which do not want to have any tensions--neither domestically nor with other countries --(and primarily do not want to bear the brunt of these), has already been expressed about him.

The two large camps are almost totally polarized 3 months prior to the elections. The only similar situation was found prior to the hysterically heated Brandt elections ff 1972. The campaign strategies connected to this situation are also adding to the disregard of opponents' arguments. The climate of opinion against the union has reached unexpected heights: 64 percent (in comparison with 35 percent in 1976) now expect a victory for the coalition with only 14 percent (in comparison with 39 percent) believing this to be true for the CDU/CSU. All other indices for the change in climate point in the same direction. Even the CDU supporters are talking more hesitantly about a victory for their party (28 percent), whereas in 1976 60 percent believed this to be the case and even in January of this year, 39 percent were still convinced of this. Eighty-six percent of the SPD supporters already view the coalition as having won the race (54 percent 4 years ago); the FDP supporters view the elections similarly with 81 (in comparison with 45) percent seeing the race won. There was probably never such a secure feeling of victory in any previous federal elections.

Two things are notable in this situation: For one, the Union parties have stabilized themselves in the last opinion polls at a level of about 45 percent--and thereby are at the same level as the Social Democrats. This is a good four percentage points lower than in 1976. Secondly, its supporters are still showing themselves active in advertising the cause of their party (automobile bumper stickers, participation in rallies, a willingness to discuss, campaign buttons). At the beginning of July, they were only slightly behind the comparable results of the SPD.

This willingness to advertize will become very important for the CDU; for its decisive handicap is the negative assessment of its leading candidate. He has thrown not less than one-third of the Union supporters into a laming predicament: For the Union but against Strauss. What can be expected is that a considerable number will not cast their ballots. The Allensbacher Institute ascertained the nonvoting portion among these "divided" Union supporters at a current 22 percent.

Calculated into the total election results, this could mean a loss of almost two percentage points for the Union or--in view of the party preferences today--a total result of only 43 percent. The two other parties would then profit with a corresponding gain in percentage points which would mainly benefit the SPD in light of the strength ratios. In view of this nonassessable shift in the voter preferences as a result of a portion of the CDU supporters not going to cast their votes, the result could very well be a chance for the SPD to obtain an absolute majority, especially if the climate of opinion against the CDU continues in September (it could press support for the CDU below the present 45-percent mark).

All demoscopic findings up to 5 October on the strength of the parties, therefore, have to be viewed cautiously, for the final result will depend very much upon the nonvoting proportion among CDU supporters. The extent of this refusal to vote can hardly be predetermined--very often it is a last-minute decision. Because of this tendency not to cast a ballot, the result of the elections for the Union depends decisively upon whether it succeeds in mobilizing its supporters in the last few weeks, in promoting willingness to support and defend the party, in reducing the negative climate of opinion and in achieving a positive effect on those who are vacillating.

9527
CSO: 3103

RURAL PARTY CONGRESS CONCENTRATES ON FALL ELECTIONS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Jul 80 p 9

[Article: "Finnish Rural Party Seeking Candidates for Elections from Lahti"]

[Text] The Finnish Rural Party (SMP), which is getting ready for the local elections in October, is holding its party congress on the first weekend of August in Lahti. The party congress is being considered primarily as a normal working meeting, and no large differences are evident with respect to leadership personnel or issues.

The SMP, which held its 20th anniversary meeting in Pori a year ago, found one surprise at that congress: Customs Director Veikko Vennamo, who had guided the party for the period of its whole existence, transferred power to his son, Diet Member Pekka Vennamo.

The party congress at Lahti will unanimously reelect the country's second youngest party leader.

One new individual will definitely be elected since the party must fill the first vice chairman's position left by the deceased Aino Poutiainen. Diet Member Urpo Leppanen will continue as party secretary.

As far as issues are concerned the party will be most concerned with making preparations for the fall local elections, in which the SMP will attempt to improve its fortunes after the resounding loss 4 years ago.

In the local elections of 1976 the SMP received only 2.1 percent of the votes and 245 delegates. The SMP was one of the big losers.

Next October according to the party leadership the SMP's goal is to double the number of delegates. The SMP intends to place 5,000 candidates on the election lists or a full 1,000 more than in the last local elections. The SMP intends to go into the fall elections with its own lists, that is, without any election alliances. The party's campaign motto is "Give Power to the People -- SMP".

A relay message from Pori to Lahti (more than 370 kilometers) will also be part of the SMP's congress. The message will be borne by the Diet's best long distance runner, Diet Member Anssi Joutsenlahti. Along the route that the message will take the SMP has organized numerous presentations at which the party will disseminate information.

Veikko Vennamo Is Still a Trademark

Veikko Vennamo, who resigned from the chairmanship a year ago, has since his transfer of power officially remained on the sidelines. In spite of this, honorary chairman Veikko Vennamo's position in the SMP continues to be strong, at least as strong as that of his chairman son.

In the past year Veikko Vennamo has been very visible to the rank and file of the SMP in, among other things, the SMP's newspaper SUOMEN UUTISET, which established a rather extensive column for him after the congress in Pori.

In Lahti Veikko Vennamo will define the party's ideological line in his keynote speech, which is normally delivered by the party's chairman.

In spite of his moving to the side, Veikko Vennamo continues to be an SMP trademark.

SMP's Success in the Elections

The SMP's best election success was at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. In the 1968 presidential elections the party received 11.3 percent of the vote; in the 1970 parliamentary elections the SMP received 10.5 percent of the vote and won 18 seats in the Diet.

In the last parliamentary elections the SMP's share of the vote was 4.6 percent and it only won 7 seats in the Diet. After Eino Poutiainen's death the number of seats in the Diet has been six since Poutiainen's replacement in the Diet was his election alliance partner from the SKL [Finnish Christian League].

The following table shows the SMP's results in elections of recent years. The percentage figure represents the party's share of the votes recorded in the elections.

Parliamentary Elections:

1966	1.0 percent
1970	10.5 percent
1972	9.2 percent
1975	3.6 percent
1979	4.6 percent

Local Elections:

1964	1.4 percent
1968	7.3 percent
1972	5.0 percent
1976	2.1 percent

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CSO: 3107

JUNNILA WEIGHS UKK ROLE, COMMUNIST POLICY, '84 ELECTION

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 20 Jul 80 p 10

[Article by Seppo Keranen: "Tuure Junnila Will Not Give Up"]

[Text] Tuure Junnila is a concept in Finnish politics. The Finnish right-wing is symbolized in him.

He admits that his views continue to become less popular. However, he believes that he is in the right.

In Junnila's opinion his own party -- the Conservative Party -- has been led astray. The individual leading it astray is Urho Kekkonen.

Tuure Jaakko Kalervo Junnila, bank director and doctor of philosophy, who will be 70 years old next Thursday, 24 July, is one of those last republicans whom President Urho Kekkonen has not been able to make into an admirer.

The only positive thing that Junnila sees in connection with Kekkonen is the fact that those living in the Munkkiniemi area of Helsinki have an opportunity in the wintertime to ski on the trails made for the President in front of his residence at Tamminiemi. Junnila himself admits that he has even traveled along those tracks on a snowmobile.

Opposing Kekkonen's policies has been Junnila's impelling force during his whole term of office in the Diet.

Junnila has sat in the Diet as a representative of the Conservative Party from the northern election district of Turku and Pori since 1951 until the parliamentary elections of 1979 with the exception of the years 1962-66.

The world has changed. Junnila has not. Today he is ever more isolated with respect to his opinions. He does not promote his policies out of stupidity. He enjoys the role of "a salmon swimming upstream".

Junnila does not ever make any of his decades-old views subject to question.

Kekkonen, An Obstacle

Junnila was one of the more colorful people in the Diet. He did not read his speeches. Having written a speech, he committed it to memory. Junnila's speeches were heard with interest.

Junnila's appearances in the Diet were accomplished with style. They did not contain Veikko Vennamo's grating noise or Georg C. Ehrnrooth's fanaticism.

Many Diet members in spite of their differences of opinion are ready to admit that after Junnila's departure the level of discussion in the Diet has fallen.

In general Junnila talked about Kekkonen. Kekkonen is for him an obstacle which he cannot get around.

Even during this interview Kekkonen's name was brought up more than 10 times in the library of Junnila's stylish Munkkiniemi home.

In Junnila's opinion Kekkonen and Kekkonen's unrestrained greed for power are the reason that the Conservative Party has been in opposition for such a long time, that the Conservative Party and the Social Democratic Party have not dared to propose their own presidential candidate, that the prestige of the Diet has decreased, that our policy of neutrality is waivering, and that Finland's political room for movement has been reduced since J. K. Paasikivi.

Companion in Arm Socialism Did Not Interest Him

Junnila became interested in politics after the war.

After the campanion-in-arms socialists Unto Varjonen, Penna Tervo, and Yrjo Kilpelainen failed in their attempt in 1947 to persuade the young economic expert of the Bank of Finland to make their expertise available to the SDP [Finnish Social Democratic Party], Junnila accepted the offer from the Conservative Party.

Junnila's political career progressed quickly when he was invited to join the board of directors of the KOP [National Shares Bank], which was created by Arvo Salminen, the chairman of the Conservative Party at that time.

Junnila succeeded in winning a seat in the Diet on the first attempt and already during his first term of office he was elected as finance minister of Sakari Tuomioja's political expertise government in 1953.

According to Junnila Tuomioja's purely bourgeois government was an excellent example of Finland's room for political movement during J. K. Paasikivi's last term of office as president.

"During our government there were no foreign policy complications," states Junnila.

With some pride Junnila points out that he was the only Conservative Party representative in the government during his previous term of office in the Diet. At this time no Conservative Party member of the Diet has had an opportunity to carry a minister's portfolio.

Free Elections

In Junnila's opinion Finland's difficulties began in 1956 when Kekkonen was elected president for the first time. According to Junnila the 1956 elections were the last free presidential elections.

According to Junnila foreign policy was not an issue of central importance in Tuomioja's government. As if to confirm his argument, he does not even remember who was that government's foreign minister. Only after a phone call to the Council of State does he recall the name of Ralf Torngren (Swedish Peoples Party).

Operation Honka

One evening in the winter of 1961 a group of men which included Junnila, Kaarlo Pitsinki (Social Democrat) and Veikko Vennamo, who had left the Agrarian League, gathered in the home of Nils Meinander (Swedish Peoples Party) in Munkkiniemi. The men had one common goal: to overthrow Kekkonen. The Honka-league came out of this discussion.

"I have never disputed my role in this attempt," states Junnila.

One name after another was deleted from the list of presidential candidates: As a former candidate of the Conservative Party Tuomioja was not suitable for the SDP, L. A. Puntila was not at that time suitable for the SDP. Bank of Finland Director Klaus Waris was not suitable for the peasants in the RKP [Swedish Peoples Party].

The desire to find a new president was so strong that an old enemy of the church, SDP Chairman Vaino Tanner, gave his blessing to Bishop Martti Simojoki's nomination as the joint candidate of the SDP and the Conservative Party. Simojoki declined. Finally they found Attorney General Olavi Honka.

The attempt failed due to a diplomatic note crisis and Honka pulled out of the race. According to Junnila the note sent by the Soviet Union to Finland was "as clear as day" connected with the presidential campaign being conducted at the time in Finland.

If it had been known that the Soviet Union would so openly interfere in an attempt to find a new president, the attempt would not have been undertaken.

"No one could have suspected such interference, since the previous presidential elections were completely free," states Junnila.

A Strong Hold

Junnila states that he had a strong hold on the Conservative Party until the beginning of the 1970's. In 1968 he promoted his party's own candidate, Matti Virkkunen, for the presidential elections.

During the exception law struggle in 1972 Junnila began to notice that his hold on the Conservative Party was slipping. In the Diet faction he began to be more alone in his opinions.

The zealous work of the party leadership and the party office against Junnila finally released his hold completely in the Diet elections of 1979.

Junnila, who describes himself as a rightwing bourgeois, still keeps a watchful eye on politics. Since his departure from the Diet he says that he his directed his energy toward writing.

He does not exclude the possibility of a political return, but considers that to be improbable at this time.

"Indeed, the elections are not until 1983, but if the political situation changes in such a way that the Conservative Party needs a candidate of my persuasion, I would not reject the offer.

"Pentti Maki-Hakola is rather isolated in the Conservative Party's Diet faction."

A Trustworthy Virolainen

"Compared to his predecessor Johannes Virolainen, the new chairman of the Center Party, Paavo Vayrynen, seems to be somewhat of a lightweight. But we shall see what age and experience will bring with it.

"I have frequently severely criticized Virolainen. As little as Virolainen could be trusted as a chairman, from the point of view of a rightwing bourgeois I consider him to be more trustworthy than Vayrynen.

"Upon going into a certain government Virolainen announced that 'this government will not become socialized'. And in these matters I trusted in him."

SDP Is Afraid of the Conservative Party

"I previously had a lot to do with the SDP even other than during the Ho[illegible] league. However, since 1966 I have gone as far away as possible from the SDP, especially Kalevi Sorsa's 'one a' social democracy.

"However, recent demands in the party to restore Vaino Tanner's reputation are a sign that the SDP's leadership is afraid that an excessive leftwing candidacy will alienate the party's voters.

"The SDP also seems to be afraid of the Conservative Party's growth."

Saarinen Is Not a Eurocommunist

"The basic reason for the political isolation of the Conservative Party lies in the Finnish Communist Party.

"The Communists along with the forces behind them have adopted a position that the rightwing must be kept outside of the government. In this respect there is no difference between Aarne Saarinen and Taisto Sinisalo. The Communists have been able to get the Center Party, the SDP, and Kekkonen to support the isolation of the Conservative Party.

"It is significant that the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] has in its most recent program abandoned Finland's foreign policy by talking about the word 'neutrality'.

"Finland's Communists adhere closely to Moscow's line, there are only degrees of difference between Saarinen and Sinisalo in this respect. However, the Saarinenites are not so independent that they could be called Eurocommunists.

"Communist behavior in domestic policies has become less Vennamo-like."

A Weak Carter

"From the point of view of detente Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was an alarming phenomenon. The Soviet Union has dared to take risks that it would not have dared to do a few years ago.

"The Soviet Union calculated correctly that the occupation of Afghanistan would not result in such countermeasures on the part of the USA that would endanger world peace.

"The Soviet Union's boldness is a result of the weakening of the position of the USA in world politics during Jimmy Carter's term of office."

A Halting Neutrality

"The YYA-[Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement was under postwar conditions a political reality which Finland was forced to accept.

"However, we must carefully adhere to the agreement's letter, spirit, and interpretation according to which the YYA-Agreement is only to be implemented in the event that Finland or the Soviet Union become the object of an attack through Finnish territory.

"As far as other sections are concerned we must keep a free hand. For example, joint military exercises are a concept foreign to this agreement. I will give our foreign policy leadership credit for the fact that joint military exercises have been rejected without any fanfare.

"Neutrality is written into the YYA-Agreement, but we have waivered from neutrality in our foreign policy. Our foreign policy is a faltering foreign policy.

1984 Will Be a Serious Year

"The 1984 presidential elections will be politically the most interesting and serious event in Finland since the night of the frost and the diplomatic crisis.

"The year 1984 will be a test of whether free presidential elections can be held in this country.

"If Kekkonen is still breathing and he wants to continue, he will continue.

"If Kekkonen does not continue, the SDP will probably take Mauno Koivisto for its own candidate. I consider this to be probable, but not positive. If the SDP does not accept Koivisto as its candidate, it will be the result of yet unknown foreign policy reasons."

Wolves Will Be Born

"From the point of view of the bourgeoisie the low-profile policy of Koivisto's government is not a bad policy. If the present government were active, then wolves would be born.

"Inflation is a matter of concern. The rapidly increasing inflation rate is partially the result of oil, but we must not forget last spring's wage solutions.

"If we make certain that wages and government expenditures will not increase by more than 5 percent, the inflation problem will be solved for the most part.

"The threat of devaluation is more probable than the threat of revaluation. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that devaluation is recommended in this situation."

In addition to politicking, Tuure Junnila sat on the board of directors of the KOP during the years 1948-75. Junnila came to the KOP from the research section of the Bank of Finland, a job which he began in 1942. He was a docent in economics at the University of Helsinki in the years 1951-77 and a professor in the years 1956-59.

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WORSENING INTERNATIONAL TENSION WORRIES DEFENSE COMMITTEE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 20 Jul 80 p 12

[Article by Timo Lipponen: "Funds Will Not Be Determined Until Fall, International Tension Surprised Finnish Defense Committee"]

[Text] How will NATO's Euro-missile decision affect Finland's security policy? And what about the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan? Or the weakening of Sweden's military position. Or NATO's weapons reserve in Norway?

The third parliamentary defense committee, which is working its way through the labyrinth of these questions, is turning out a new document on Finland's security and defense policy.

The black clouds in the skies of international politics have for the time being cast a shadow over the work of the committee, which has been described as relevant, representative, and diligent.

The committee's chairman, Chief Editor Jan-Magnus Jansson, considers it possible that it will become necessary to petition for a postponement of the commission which concludes at the end of the year.

In addition to deliberating the international situation and Finland's security policy, the main task of the committee is to determine the requirements of the defense forces and to develop their defense capabilities for the years 1982-86 as well as to outline defense policy over a 15-year period.

Budgetary aspects will not be treated until the fall. For the time being only the Army's concept of the development of its defense branch has been heard. The Army occupies a central position in the developmental program, a matter which Defense Commander General Lauri Sutela pointed out a not very long time ago.

Finland's Position Accelerated Discussions

The defense committee, which is presently on summer vacation, has for the time being been wrestling with the first two chapters. They deal with the international situation and a definition of Finland's security policy position.

Nearly 30 experts, diplomats, researchers, generals, and individuals from high positions in government have been heard on this issue.

Since Finnish military experts in Nordic countries were included among the individuals making presentations, the discussions were quite detailed.

Differences of opinion in the committee related to whether the possible weakening of Sweden's defense capability will have an effect on the conditions of our country's neutral policy. In the background is the idea that if Sweden's defense capability definitely declines, it would result in countermeasures on the part of NATO in Denmark and Norway and further countermeasures on the part of the Soviet Union in Finland.

Was the Leftwing Led Around By the Nose?

The previous defense committee, which submitted a report in 1976, stated the issue unambiguously:

"Sweden's traditional nonalignment is a positive factor from Finland's point of view. Sweden's powerful and diverse defense system supports its policy of neutrality, which is of considerable importance for keeping the situation stable in all of the Nordic area. During a possible military entanglement the defense capability of a neutral Sweden will in itself reduce any military threat directed at Finnish territory."

However, in Communist circles primarily it is considered that this statement known as "Jansson's paragraph" represents a concept of Nordic equilibrium which has been banned on the left:

"It went through with very little notice... Its literal approval seemed so easy, as one Communist, who was familiar with the issue, declares."

On the Border Area It Is Quiet, But...

The committee's problems at this time is to determine how permanent the changes occurring in the world are. Since the Nordic area is not isolated from the rest of the world, such a distant event as the occupation of Afghanistan can be reflected in northern Europe.

As was stated in the committee, it is not a matter of indifference to Finland if "a certain" military alliance intends to demonstrate that it is serious in the so-called fringe areas. Or countermeasures can aggravate the situation within the vicinity of our own borders.

Committee Chairman Jan-Magnus Jansson notes, however, that only slight changes compared to the previous report will be made to the conclusion's position -- if they will even be necessary later.

A new feature in the forthcoming report is the inclusion of developing countries. A real threat to world peace over the long run is seen to be hiding in this area.

Slight Admustments or a Complete Revision

Between non-socialists and socialists the discussion continues as to whether the whole report should be "rewritten" as far as the conclusions concerning Finland's position are concerned or whether "slight adjustments" should be made so that the consistent policy line with respect to earlier reports would be retained.

The socialists support a new analysis -- others do not see any reason for this.

Jansson reminds the defense committee of the exceptional position.

"Even though the opposition has been included, we have always reached a considerable degree of unanimity," states Jansson, who has acted as chairman in two previous defense committees.

"This report will be read in its entirety -- there will only be excerpts from the others," grins Jansson.

The previous report contained only 56 pages, and there is no intent to increase the number of pages. In Jansson's opinion the work is sufficient for a document which can be used in teaching, among other things.

It is characteristic of the committee's work that hairs were split in the discussions, but the final paper contains concise, short, and carefully weighed statements.

Even though we have been diligent -- at times meetings have been held several times a week -- Jansson considers it very possible that it will become necessary to petition for a continuation of the work.

"Nordic Position Is Strong"

"The durability of the conclusions made so far will be reconsidered in the final stage of the committee's work. Euro-missiles have naturally been discussed," states Jansson.

He will not agree to evaluating the effects of NATO's Euro-missile decision, but he gives his view in general of the nuclear arms race:

"It is a tension increasing phenomenon, which is not a matter of indifference to Finland."

Jansson emphasizes the significance of Nordic equilibrium, and any factors disturbing it are detrimental to Finland.

NATO's intentions to store arms in Norway have not yet been realized. According to Jansson the matter will be followed closely, but the venture is still an open issue in Norway. His own opinion is that Sweden's military power is so strong that a couple of points one way or another on the graph with respect to the international balance will not affect the Nordic area.

"In spite of all the uproar, the Nordic position is stable," states Jansson.

Discordant Notes From the Left

Generally speaking, all the non-socialist experts join in the chairman's view.

The more one goes to the left, the more critical becomes the attitude toward the official line.

On the extreme leftwing it is considered certain that the plans to store weapons contain within them a Trojan Horse: The new nuclear weapons are very small compared with the weapons of the older generation in the beginning of the 1970's.

It will be easy to store the new weapons in a nearly ready-to-use mode in Norway, for example, and the most important component of the weapon can be smuggled into the country to its final destination in a suitcase, at which time the nuclear weapons would become operational.

The extreme leftwing -- which is represented in the defense committee -- considers it certain that the weapons of the West are no longer being deployed as a threat as before, but are indeed being deployed for actual use.

Also the People's Democrats and the Social Democrats would give one to understand that Norway's limited NATO-policy -- which does not permit nuclear arms or foreign troops -- is gradually changing.

Assistant State Secretary Keijo Korhonen states Finland's official position: Finland trusts in Norway's announcement that its policy line is not changing, and we cannot interfere in Norway's internal affairs.

Cruise Missile Will Not Disappoint the Observer

One issue which the third defense committee will certainly not consider is the wording of the importance of the YYA-[Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement. The previous committee struggled to get it into its final form. The following was written about the agreement:

"Of central importance in Finland's security policy is the introductory statement in the YYA-Agreement that the parties concerned take into consideration Finland's striving to remain outside of the conflicts of interests between the superpowers."

This statement, which creates the basis of Finland's neutrality, also presupposes a practical readiness to protect its neutrality.

The cruise missile is the most recent item which has stimulated the security policy discussion, and even the defense committee has not been able to avoid it.

The much dramatized cruise missile is not so much a military issue as it is a political issue: How to make other countries assured of even some kind of preventive capacity.

The most difficult thing is observation of the cruise missile. The only tenable solution on the part of the Army was the proposed installation of sensory observation points along the Gulf of Bothnia.

A Flock of Gulls or the Enemy?

The low-level radar network now being completed will partially alleviate the situation, but it is also known from the peculiarities of the cruise missile that the picture shown on the radar screen will make it difficult to tell whether it is a cruise missile or a flock of gulls.

The problem results from the fact that the cruise missile flies in the clouds at perhaps a height of only 30 meters and its surface material is not sufficient to show a decent picture on the radar screen.

When the missile is observed, normal antiaircraft equipment and destroyers are able to repel and detain it.

When the target is still at some distance from the cruise missile its altitude is suitable to serve as a target for the SA-3 (antiaircraft missile-79) missiles being procured by Finland.

The third parliamentary defense committee now in session is probably favorable to the idea that defensive capabilities can be improved. A purchasing recommendation for the procurement of new missiles is, however, in the offing. Reference was made to this already by the proposal of the previous committee:

"Decisions to develop missile weaponry presuppose a separate solution to be accomplished at the political level."

The committee is also deliberating the long-term period of 15 years.

The Possibility of a Joint Defense

According to Finland's official interpretation military cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union will be implemented under the situation strictly defined in the YYA-Agreement. This was approved with almost complete unanimity.

Even though the minority Communists argued that discussions have been held in Finland with respect to possible defensive cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union on the basis of the YYA-Agreement, no such discussion has, however, been held to the knowledge of the defense committee.

The majority Communists are of a completely different opinion. "If the situation becomes difficult, there are channels of negotiation other than the military articles of the YYA-Agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union."

Military Budget to Be Treated in the Fall

It is expected on the part of the defense committee that the committee will continue an even policy of development with a definite goal in mind: an annual growth rate of 5 percent would represent a positive development curve. In addition, it is hoped that there will be enough to cover expenditures caused by increasing costs due to technical developments in materials.

In Army circles it is also considered that the current 1.5 percent gross national product will not be sufficient over the long run.

Raising the GNP to 1.75 percent, for example, is considered possible over the long run even though the committee has for the time being been prepared to only maintain the current level.

In committee circles it is believed that the horse trading will begin when "the matter itself" will come up for discussion in the fall. It has even been argued that unanimity with respect to funds can be ahhieved if a simultaneous agreement is reached on directing funds toward research on peace.

The daily allocations for conscripts, and the compensation for reservists will take up 2.8 percent of the total defense expenditures. The transfer of these funds -- 70 million markkas at this time -- to the budget of the Social and Health Ministry would guarantee a better material development for the defense forces. The Social and Health Ministry has handled social assistance payments to the relatives of conscripts from before.

The Mobility of the Army to Be Improved

Air defense, in particular, has swallowed up a considerable portion of the funds in recent years. In Army circles there have long been indignant discussions about the fact that money is being thrown away (so that certain individuals can fly).

The announcement of the commander of the defense forces about the last decade with respect to the Army must be seen against this background and not so much as a command of the committee.

After 5 years it is intended to improve the mobility of the Army. This improvement will concern trucks, tanks, (the tank unit of the Lapland Light Infantry Brigade will be expanded into a company), sleds, bicycles, and perhaps even helicopters.

In addition, the Navy is looking at the series production of a battleship, and the Air Force wants to procure destroyers for the Satakunta Flight Detachment.

The list of shortages in all branches of the defense forces is longer than actual purchases. However, it is a question of such a cumbersome institution that if something is to be obtained, one must start beating the drum early.

The Defense Committee

The committee's chairman Professor and Chief Editor Jan-Magnus Jansson (Swedish Peoples Party), Vice Chairman and Diet Member Reino Breilin (Social Democrat), Diet Member Hannu Tapiola (Social Democrat), Professor Raimo Vayrynen (Social Democrat), First Secretary Jorma Hentila (Communist), Editor Matti Viialainen (Communist), Bank Director Ahti Karjalainen (Center Party), Diet Membrr Mikko Pesala (Center Party), Chairman Ilkka Suominen (Conservative Party), Diet Member Tapani Morttinen (Conservative Party), Diet Member Olavi Nikkila (Conservative Party), and Chairman Raino Westerholm (Christian League).

Permanent experts on the committee are Under-State Secretary Keijo Korjonen, Department Chief Aimo Pajunen, Lt. Gen. Jaako Valtanen, and Institute Director Tapio Varis.

The permanent experts participate in all the meetings of the committee, but they do not have the right to vote.

The secretaries of the committee are Lt. Col. Gustav Hagglund (Chief Secretary), Capt. Sakari Visa, Editor Reijo Lindroos, and Political Scientist Rene Nyberg.

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SDP'S TUOMIOJA URGES PARTY TO ACCEPT CONSERVATIVE COALITION

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 27 Jul 80 p 3

[Review by Ralf Friberg of a book by Erkki Tuomioja entitled "Critique of a Democracy Without Alternative"]

> [Text] Both as an active politician and as a political writer, social democrat Erkki Tuomioja has said that the Conservative Party should again enter a Finnish government. For ideologist Tuomioja it is primarily a matter of having a clear middle-class government alternative. In his new book Tuomioja develops his thesis. In the last two decades politics in Finland have offered few election choices. Large coalitions have reelected President Urho Kekkonen. The parties on the left and the bourgeois center have held the reins of government almost the entire time. The political parties have all consolidated and expanded their own positions. Extensive wage agreements representing government income policies have captured wage earners, employers, and the Diet all in the same net. In short, there is reason for widespread and basic criticism of the condition of our government as it actually functions.

Former member of parliament and child prodigy Erkki Tuomioja has, on the eve of the political doldrums, come out with a critique. He calls his pamphlet, "Critique of a Democracy Without Alternative" (Vaihtoehdottoman demokratian kritiikki, Otava).

Critic of the System

It is hardly surprising that city councilman Erkki Tuomioja is now setting himself up as a critic of the system. During his active parliamentary period he often came up with inopportune replies. He did not run as a candidate for the electoral college before Kekkonen's reelection in 1978, and he left the parliament voluntarily after having held his seat during the entire 1970's.

Tuomioja writes and declaims in his pamphlet as a convinced social democrat, despite the fact that some of his positions have so many reservations and barbs that he seems to have chosen the Social Democratic Party only for lack of a better alternative! So he is difficult to understand. Besides his parliamentary service he was long the driving force in a strong local left-wing opposition in the Helsinki party district. He has also been an energetic participant in party congresses since the whirlwind breakthrough at the Abo congress of 1969.

According to Tuomioja, Finland has entered a period of social forbearance between powers which really should be in conflict with one another. This results in cooperation by strait jacket, lack of voting choice for individuals and political groups, general apathy and uncritical indifference. Only the youth have sounded the alarm against this humdrum pattern.

Critical Distance From Kekkonen

Tuomioja began his political career as an enthusiastic supporter of Urho Kekkonen. But he was one of the first (and so far the only) politicians in today's government parties who tried to demonstrate a critical loyal distance. Tuomioja therefore finds it logical to start with the great and multifaceted progress of the Finnish people under Kekkonen's leadership to find out what the banquet has cost.

The starting point is clear. Urho Kekkonen has during his entire political career advocated understanding and harmony between groups in our society. Among the leading politicians he is the only one who, through personal traumatic involvement, remembers the civil war.

Neither the president nor his supporters could suspect the real importance of the rebuilding of the government after the shocking victory of the left in 1966.

Not only the social democrats came into the government, but also the communists, who ended an 18-year period of isolation. And the red/green cooperation has continued. "The biggest problem in our government today is that it is so overstabilized and permanent, on the verge of stagnation," writes Tuomioja. It probably comes naturally for a young and successful statesman to desire a bit more happy instability in our government, but the big question continues to be how much of that kind of thing is really good for us.

In Tuomioja's writing of history, the 60's resulted in a nearly permanent government coalition and a good record in social improvement thanks to prompt and stable growth. The 70's opened the doors to something similar to an all-party government, although Kekkonen had not formally been in the government since 1964 - 66 ("unless the moon falls from the sky or easterly dispatches complicate matters").

Forget the Questions of Eternity

In the 70's the left was invited to abandon its demand for structural, that is qualitative, changes in society. It was time, at the president's recommendation, to forget the questions of eternity, and the chief of state announced that a broad majority government should be installed following the election of 1975. Before the TV cameras the party leaders then received a memorable scolding. Without altering Tuomioja uses Prof L. A. Puntila's term for this way of building a government, "horsewhip parliamentary."

All-Party Government

After the Miettunen government came together it swung to the right. But that swing did not last long, the parties concerned were not happy. Yet Tuomioja speaks of an all-party government since the middle of the 70's. He sees the causes as the president, the constitution, and the income policies. The president has experienced increasing support for his foreign policy. "Weak party leaders have too easily abandoned their right of decision in questions where one should not require the help of the president." Besides the chief justice and the commander in chief the president has also become a sort of modern god. Here I think Tuomioja is too harsh. It is certainly no longer true for the sitting Koivisto government, and it was not true when our majority governments were energetic. And that has by no means been always.

The terms of the constitution are well known. It is a fact that each long-lived majority government must deal with the opposition in order to get important legal propositions promptly clarified with 5/6 majority and approved with 2/3 of the votes in the Diet. As is known, cooperation with the right has been essential and even traded in the political game during long periods of the 70's.

The income policies employed by the government do not win Tuomioja's undivided approval.

Finland is hardly a leading country in that connection, although the author pretends that it is. For example, Austria has a much older and more socially aware system than we, and there the social democrats have long had government power by themselves, and in a basically conservative country besides!

Parliamentary Procedures Wither Away

Parliamentary procedures in our country suffer in an all-party government. Democracy suffers a loss of self-confidence. The citizens lose confidence in the possibilities of politics. This is especially true of the younger age groups. When the all-party government just continues on, election

after election, it is difficult to motivate the voters for democracy as a form of government. "In many ways it would be healthy if voters could vote right or left, and at the same time could defeat an arrangement between one or more bourgeois or left-wing alternatives to government. Clearer principal alternatives would also lessen the taste of personal intrigue, which is so strong in our political soup," said Tuomioja.

The footsteps of apathy are followed by torpor when it is a matter of a certain political morality. And the people regard consistent politicians all as members of the same clique.

Criticism of the SDP [Social Democratic Party]

What then are Tuomioja's conclusions? Naturally his own party, the SDP, gets the harshest criticism. He wishes that the SDP would be heading the government when it becomes necessary to uphold the current system Tuomioja criticizes the SDP on many points. For example, while the party does not have conditions for cooperation with the bourgeois parties, cooperation with the communists is a strictly regulated question where procedural matters are important. The socialists--regardless of color--also lack an alternative to "sick capitalism."

"A party which fights openly against a bureaucracy that draws away from the people and which gives reasons why the people remain so dubious about parties and politicians must also look with a critical eye at the phenomenon of its own power."

A Hard Complaint

The hardest of Tuomioja's complaints, and the one I prefer not to believe, is that the parties on the left abandoned the reform of industrial democracy because the established interest groups within the left wing were afraid that they could not control developments on the shop floors, and then a middle group would get a foothold in the trade union movement. That has in fact already happened, independent of legislation. This can be seen at Rautaruukkis Industries at Brahestad, among others. Tuomioja makes a similar accusation on the question of regional democracy at the municipal level.

In a larger connection than the SDP and party power, Tuomioja wants to revitalize parliamentary procedure by bringing the Conservative Party into the government. From the viewpoint of SDP that would have neither more nor less negative effect than to govern jointly with the Center Party now that agrarian radicalism has already died out.

In this connection Tuomioja prefers not to go into the reasons which SDP chairman Kalevi Sorsa has offered for the SDP negative to a coalition. Since Sorsa's defense was both genuine and carefully thought out, a controversy here would not have been more fruitful than a direct declaration. But Tuomioja wants to cultivate the alternative. He would favor an all-bourgeois government with an all-red opposition.

SDP in Pamphlets

Tuomioja's pamphlet is now the third in a short time which deals mostly with the SDP in our country. Compared with Seppo Tikka's compilation of interviews (Sorsa-Oivio) or Erkki Taatikainen's subjective and bitter tirades, Tuomioja's is the most substantial squaring of accounts. In addition he has the most immediate experience with the events that he writes about.

The result is a stimulating book, in spite of Tuomioja's desire to play the role of "enfant terrible." At least he does not try to butter up his readers by using overly simple expressions and sentences. The book also gossips about his education in history and politics. It has not been long since the first volume of Tuomioja's biography of K. H. Wiik came from the printer.

A Hard Leader

Tuomioja's book is welcome, in spite of the question marks and objections which one notes in the margins. There is a shortage of good pamphlets just now. It is too bad that he is so reticent about himself, if not about his contributions during the 70's. How did it happen that he did not succeed better as a leading politician in raising our contribution to underdeveloped countries? How can he claim that our defense is organized against a Soviet invasion if he participated in the second parliamentary defense committee's deliberations, where not a word was said about such a thing?

And what does he have to say about his activity as a kind of intellectual leader for the SDP left wing, a leader who was often in dispute, and hard to accept?

It is perhaps too early to expect complete memory pictures from a 35-year-old politician. But the chapter about Finland's EEC membership in the new book raises so much interest that the question must be addressed.

Meanwhile we must be patient. Tuomioja is still only half a private man.

He is just as capable in politics as in books, only time is passing. In both cases it may be that he will continue to irritate those in power, like a kind of stubborn and naive boy scout. Dear me, if only the political life of our country could produce more of such British-type politicians. Then also the political alternatives which Tuomioja seeks, would be more abundant. Ability speaks for itself. It is not enough for decision makers to ask only the right questions. They must also be able to answer. And there the city councilman of Helsinki continues to grow.

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POLITICAL, ECONOMIC STABILITY OF OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French No 602, Mar 80 [as published] pp 39-42

[Excerpts from the press conference in early June of Paul Dijoud, interior ministry secretary of state for overseas departments and territories--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

> [Text] Mr Paul Dijoud, interior minister secretary of state for overseas departments and territories, on returning from a trip to New Caledonia, discussed the main issues facing Overseas Departments and Territories in a press conference in early June. We are excerpting from this conference some [of his] views on the political and economic situation in overseas France.

Guadelupe: Three Big Economic Issues

The situation in Guadelupe is satisfactory in large part because of the determination of the economic and social interlocutors in the department to push ahead with the important economic and social questions. Witness the results obtained in the areas of land reform, sugar activity, and the development of the leeward coast.

Regarding /land reform,/ the decisions taken will be among the most important taken in France. In 5 years, 10,000 hectares of lands will be bought by SAFER [Real Estate and Rural Development Company] to be allocated to growers and to renewed or new cultivation. The state will commit financial means up to 400 million Fr. to insure the success of this plan. A combined facility for training of growers and creation of cooperatives is of course forseen. The land reform will be conducted locally by a committee bringing together appointed social professionals and civil servants.

On the /Leeward Coast,/ the secretary of state has indicated that the resources necessary for economic development and the installation of equipment for the mountain zone, the coastal zone, and the urban zone of Basse-Terre will be freed shortly.

As to the new thrust in /sugar activity,/ this will be enhanced by the improvement of productivity and by a restructuring of the sugar factories, which will make the price of a ton of sugar more lucrative. The goal of /The objectives/ are to return to the Melanesian group their traditional lands, a basic element in their history and their identity; to consolidate the position of the colonists by compromise and by equitable and reciprocal sacrifices; and to promote the full exploitation of the soil, through agricultural development, by training farmers and integrating them [into agricultural life].

/Implementation/ is gradual: some 10 or 15 years will be necessary for the reform to succeed, but this is the top priority of the long-term development plan for New Caledonia adopted by the territorial assembly last year. It is experimental during 1979 and 1980: 8,000 hectares were redistributed in 1979, 12,000 hectares will be in 1980. State assistance will mount up to 9 million Fr. at a minimum. It is coordinated. Land reform should benefit all the ethnic communities in the territory. It should take into account everyone's aspirations and impose on none. The proposed legislation is submitted informationally to the territorial assembly before being presented to Parliament. It should be noted that agrarian reform is accompanied by a major program of agricultural development, especially of coffee and in training of farmers.

Polynesia: A Contractual Policy

As is well known, the status of the territory is defined by the law of 12 July 1977. Most economic, social, and cultural questions come under the jurisdiction of the territory. A government council of 7 members as well as an assembly elected by universal suffrage provides the administration of the territory's jurisdictions.

The high commissioner retains only those powers specifically enumerated in the law. He precides over the government council but does not have the right to vote. It is the vice president, a Polynesian, who provides the effective presidency of the council in most of its prerogatives, and who signs the territorial acts taken in council. The high commissioner guarantees the implementation of the council's decisions. An economic and social council can make any proposals in the field of development.

The objective of the government is to practice a contractual policy, by means of past agreements between the state and the territory. Seven conventions were accordingly signed in April on professional training, health, etc.

The Condominium of New Hebrides: A Difficult Independence

Since the Paris conference of July 1977 when the decision was taken to institute an internally autonomous regime in New Hebrides, in expectation

of making the Franco-British condominium evolve toward independence, the constant concern of the French government has been, in close consultation with the British government, to ensure a reconciliation of all the factions of New Hebrides political life by that date [of independence].

This concern was expressed first of all in the creation, in December 1978, of a government of national unity led by Father Leymang. The francophone moderates, legally in power because of the refusal of the Vanuaaka Party (VAP), a pro-independence movement predominantly anglophone, to participate in the elections of 29 November 1977, agreed to open up the government to representatives of this party in numbers equal to their own representation.

The effort toward reconciliation of all the inhabitants of the New Hebrides was also illustrated in September 1979 by the extent of the consensus in favor of the constitution of the new state. An exchange of letters on 23 October 1979 between the French and British governments provided that the protocol of 6 August that had created the condominium would end with independence, which would occur on a date to be determined in 1980.

The peoples of the archipelago then elected, on 14 November 1979, with great calmness and with participation of more than 90 percent, their representatives to the representative assembly and to the regional councils, which will remain in place at independence. These elections saw the victory of the Vanuaaka Party with a two-thirds majority in the representative assembly (26 out of 39 seats). VAP also received a bare majority in the regional councils of Santo and Tanna, but this election has been the object of a dispute which is still in progress. The president of VAP, Rev. Walter Lini, was designated prime minister by the representative assembly and put together a government composed exclusively of representatives of his party.

From that date the climate of mutual understanding rapidly deteriorated. In the face of a government vain of its electoral victory, a growing feeling of frustration was born in the minority. Some of its representatives refused to sit in the representative assembly and a move toward challenging the legal government grew in the islands, supported on Tanna by the traditional chiefs and organizing in Santo around the personality of Jimmy Stevens, leader of the Nagriamel. The existence and the authority of government deputies in the territorial districts have been challenged, despite the intervention of the militia sent by the tutelary powers, who are still responsible for maintenance of public order.

In light of this political impasse, the French government, working always in coordination with the British government, has made numerous efforts toward a resumption of dialog between the legal government and the opposition. At the meeting in Paris on 8 January 1980 with the prime minister, the two tutelary powers affirmed their support for the government and deplored any secessionist action which could jeopardize the unity of the archipelago, the New Hebrides government on its side undertaking to open up a dialog with the traditional chiefs.

Southern Lands: Rich Possibilities

The administration of the Southern Lands has been fundamentally reorganized and a long-term policy is under study. Scientific endeavors will continue there, but there will be more and more efforts to develop economic activity: fishing, prospecting for petro-metallic nodules, oil prospecting--a permit has just been issued to Elf Aquitaine.

100,000 tons of sugar should be met.

It should be emphasized that the sugar and banana harvests will be slightly smaller in 1980 than in 1979. The measures taken following hurricanes David and Frederick have allowed a rapid recovery of production in these two sectors. On the other hand, the experiments in palletization and containerization for the transporting of the banana production, which in part conditions the future of the port and the city of Basse-Terre, are being studied carefully in concert with the planters, administrative officials, and the transport companies.

Finally, specific measures are being taken to boost tourism and investment assistance in the productive sectors.

Martinique: Public Order and Dialog

In Martinique, the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980 were characterized by a certain deterioration in the social, economic, and political climate. The profound malise which has been expressed on different occasions (strikes, the blocking of Fort-de-France, the sacking of offices, impeding the liberty to work, sequestrations, etc.) was caused by structural problems (changes in the economy of the department), problems unique to Martinique (the tiny size of the territory, limited economic potential, etc.) and circumstances. In particular, hurricanes David and Frederick, by ravaging the banana plantations, put many agricultural workers and small peasants out of work. Also, it is certain that extremist elements tried to politically destabilize this department which has always, and did so once again in 1978, show strong support for departmental status.

Facing the threat of disorder, the government decided to ensure that, in the first place, public security would be preserved, by sending on 6 March 2 squadrons of mobile police. Security of persons and property was thus assured.

Presently, it seems possible, all the while maintaining security and tranquillity, to resume dialog on the economic and social plane and to deal in depth with the problems that present themselves: restructuring of the sugar industry, diversification of agriculuure, the creation of industry, social housing, progressive reduction of the disparity with metropolitan France...). The General Council has asked the government to set up an overall plan for progress.

Meanwhile, we must note the encouraging successes in many areas: especially the recovery of the banana yield in June 1980, the success of the fishing plan, as well as the opening of the Manzo dam, and the new possibilities in the South-East in agriculture.

The sugar problem is not the primary one, but it is very complicated. Half of the sugar cane production is utilized in the distilleries and half in the sugar factories. Sugar production in 1971 was 28,000 tons, in 1975 15,000 tons, and in 1980 7,000 tons; while that of Reunion is 260,000 tons on average. Local consumption is about 12,000 tons.

Why this decline in production? The retail price of Martinique's sugar is high; exporting was no longer profitable, and imported sugar (including sugar from Guadeloupe) is often cheaper than the local sugar. First of all, on this very small island (1,000 km-sq compared to 1,800 km-sq for Guadeloupe) with its hilly terrain, little of the land can be machine-cultivated. Also, the industrial facilities (2 factories) are antiquated, their productivity low. Martinique above all has a rum-making tradition: it produces 80,000 hectaliters of rum, of which metropolitan France consumes 110,000 [sic]. Finally, sugar cane is above all a source of income (oftimes extra [income] for numbers of small farmers) more than a creator of jobs; thus, the sugar harvest has to rely on foreign workers temporarily authorized to immigrate to the department.

The objectives of the government and the officials are in harmony. The General Council has undertaken a major study of the sugar problem: it wants a vigorous recovery in production. For his part, Mr Dijoud confirmed that by any assumptions Martinique should produce as much sugar as it consumes (10,000 to 14,000 tons).

The industrial facilities must be renovated. One of the projects consists of regrouping all production around one enlarged and modernized factory, at small net cost. The General Council has taken the position that a mixed enterprise, with public participation, should manage this future production unit. The secretary of state is not against this, on condition that competent industrials provide sufficiently credible guaranty of their management.

The planters must also be assisted in modernization, mechanization, and joining together to make the sugar business competitive.

Finally, the production and marketing of Martinique rum must be supported, as it is one of the hopes for the future of sugar cane in Martinique.

Guyana: Effective Start-Up of the Plan

At the end of 1979, after several trips to Guyana, the secretary of state, together with officials and social professionals, brought about a profound alteration in the objectives of the Plan.

Regarding /forests,/ the possibilities for increasing production of wood come to 300,000 to 350,000 cubic meters of raw timber by 1985. In 1979 production was 90,000 cubic meters, and 100,000 to 150,000 cubic meters is expected in 1980. There presently are 5 companies exploiting the forests. Two new projects are going up at Kourou and Saint-Laurent. A program of promoting Guyanese wood on the metropolitan and European market is financed by FIDOM [expansion unknown]. The forest penetration program has been redefined and directed toward a strengthening of the resources of FIDOM and of the National Forestry Fund. The big paper-making plans have had to be deferred. They will be reconsidered when conditions in the paper market appear more favorable.

As for /infrastructure,/ a 5-year construction program (225 million Fr.) beginning in 1980 has been ordered, including 43 million for the ports and 122 million for roads, and it has been started up. The work on dredging the Maroni harbor continues; it has already made possible a significant improvement in Saint-Laurent's service. Work on construction of a "roll-on, roll-off" bridge (12 million Fr.) connecting Degrad and Cannes will start in July.

In 1980, 21 million Fr. is allocated by FIDOM to development of /agriculture./ Fruit-tree cultivation (green citrons, maracudjas [translation unknown]) is yielding interesting results. As for rice, problems remain to be solved before actually arriving at several thousand hectares of rice-farming land, which is still a long-term goal. Soy-bean experiments continue. In order to train farmers, the resources of the Suzini college have been strengthened. At the beginning of the 1980 academic year it will be changed into a professional agricultural training school.

In the livestock sector, there are major developments: 3,500 hectares of grass-land, 3,000 imported head of stock, 60 tons of meat sold in 1979, and the possibility of 300 to 400 tons of meat production in 1980.

Finally, there are grounds for great optimism in the areas of exploitation of minerals (kaolin) and aquaculture (shrimp farming).

An interministerial mission recently went to Guyana with a view to remedying some hitches in local operations and administration. In fact, it is necessary to keep watch to make sure that the very important resources made available to Guyana are rapidly and effectively engaged.

Reunion: 5 Months After "Hyacinth"

Everyone knows that Reunion was ravaged in January 1980 by hurrican "Hyacinth." Of course, the trauma was considerable, but 5 months later Reunion has really gotten back on its feet again.

Let us recall the main measures which have been taken.

--As an emergency measure, 15 million Fr. was distributed by the mayors and the administration in the weeks following the hurricane, and 19 million Fr. was assigned to site development.

--[The government has] assumed responsibility for 100 percent of the damages to the national, departmental, township and rural road system.

--A special program of 100 million Fr. was approved for social housing (the annual endowment is 140 million Fr.)

--Sugar cane assistance: special assistance in fertilizers, help in replanting of destroyed cane, aid in restoring plantation roads.

--Aid to upland geranium planters: 40 percent for the lost harvest, 90 percent for reconstituting the beds, aid of 700 Fr. per month to the 3,000 specially designated.

--Intervention of Credit Agricole: the advance of 20 million Fr. at 3 percent in loans for industrial enterprises affected by the disaster.

Five months afterward, Reunion has certainly gotten going again: the sugar harvest seems satisfactory, the planters in the uplands have not "deserted" as some feared, an unprecedented program of action against unhealthy habitats is being readied, and the primary infrastructure is restored or in course of being restored.

The Territorial Community of Mayotte

The law of 22 December 1979 confirmed the special status of the "territorial community of the Republic" of Mayotte (400 km-sq, 45,000 inhabitants). Since the passage of this law, three directions have been pursued by the secretary of state.

--Reflection on the nature and conditions of the effort for economic and social development and of the equipment to be brought to Mayotte: special emphasis on the health effort (improvement of hospital equipment, vaccination campaign, family planning); perseverance in the effort at education and training (literacy-raising); acceleration of the infrastructure effort (roads, port improvement); agricultural development.

--Adjustment, through ordinances, adapting legislation so as to permit the best possible operation of the public authorities. A working group chaired by a state councillor is working there.

--Supporting and simplifying relations (very numerous both at the personal and familial level) between the Comoros and Mayotte.

France's promise to protect Mayotte's security should permit the Mahoraise [Translation unknown] population to contemplate its neighbors with confidence and serenity.

New Caledonia: Land Reform

As it is in the Antilles and in Reunion, land reform in New Caledonia is a master-stroke of government policy "aimed at building overseas a more just and fraternal society."

/The situation/ is the following. Arable land is scarce: 210,000 hectares, or 12 percent of the surface area of the territory, of which barely 30,000 hectares are truly fertile. The land is distributed unequally: 432,000 hectares for 1,000 farms, mostly owned by proprietors of European origin; 160,000 hectares for 23,000 rural Melanesians. A large part of the surface are is not being utilized intensively for agriculture.

/At the moment, as we go to press, Mr Paul Dijoud is presenting to the national assembly, on 6 June, an analysis of the government's policy in the Overseas Departments and Territories, from which we present several further details./

"(...) Each of the overseas departments and territories has reached, in the course of the last 20 years, a standard of living and a level of social protection incomparably higher than those enjoyed by most of their neighbors. Regarding standard of living, it can be pointed out that the overseas departments and territories are rather rapidly approaching metropolitan France, and that the disparity between them and their surrounding countries has become considerable. Thus the per capita gross domestic product in 1978 was 18,000 Fr. in Martinique, 13,000 Fr. in Guadelupe, 13,500 in Reunion, 24,000 Fr. in New Caledonia, and 17,000 Fr in Polynesia. At the same time, it was only 4,900 Fr. in Cuba, 2,500 in Grenada, 1,250 in Haiti (or 6 times less than Guadelupe). In 10 years, the GDP per capita had grown by 204 percent in Martinique, 150 percent in Reunion, 146 percent in Guadelupe, 140 percent in Polynesia, and 86 percent in New Caledonia, which however was hit by an economic crisis of exceptional gravity. We note, finally, that between 1958 and 1980, the gross domestic product grew by a factor of 15 in Gudelupe and of 17 in Martinique.

"Concerning social protection, an extraordinary effort has been made in the overseas departments which, little by little, has allowed a growing number of our compatriots to benefit from the basic protections which go with French citizenship. Far from flagging, this major effort has even been accelerated in recent months; we must point out that the total of allowances paid out in the overseas departments has grown from 300 million Fr. in 1974 to almost 1.5 billion Fr. in 1980, a much greater increase than in metropolitan France itself.

framework as coherent and complementary as possible. Next, trying to base the development of our departments and territories on a larger view, even if this implies international cooperation. Finally, to take as much advantage as possible from the integration of the departments and from the association of the territories with the European Economic Community, in order to maximize the yield on investments and market prices. This is the object of the two memoranda lodged by the government--one for the departments, the other for the territories--and recently taken under consideration by the authorities in Brussels.

It is in this spirit that we are trying to build in the overseas [departments and territories] an intentional, open policy with real long-term objectives. Little by little, each department and territory is acquiring a medium and long term development plan, broadly coordinated beforehand, which constitutes a charter for those working in this direction, and which obliges us to concentrate our efforts on a certain number of common decisions. This is already the case in New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and Guyana, whose development plan starts up in 1980, in the Antilles with the "20 points of support" for economic and social development, and in the uplands [? Fr. "Hauts"] of Reunion. This will also be the case in the context of the thinking begun on the Eighth Plan on Polynesia, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, and Mayotte, and also, of course, on the Southern Lands which for France constitute a real opportunity for the future.

"But we must not deceive ourselves, this development policy most often requires some structural reforms, some of which were begun in recent years, and which are today being vigorously pursued...."

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CSO: 3100

CONGRESS VIEWS EUROPEAN METAL ORES RESERVES

Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Jul 80 p 13

[Article by Maurice Arvonny: "Inventory of Mineral Resources--European Metal Production May Double in 10 or 15 Years, Experts Say"]

[Text] The 26th International Geology Congress, which began on 7 July in Paris, was the occasion for a discussion among a half-dozen specialists and representatives of the press. The theme of the discussion was non-energy mineral resources--how to evaluate the reserves? What quantities are available and what are the risks of exhaustion? Where is it pertinent to speak of strategic products? What geopolitical problems does exploitation pose?

It is important first of all to define the terms. "Reserves" is a word with an economic and possibly political meaning applied to quantities which can be exploited under economical conditions on the local market. It is necessary to distinguish between known reserves, probable reserves, and potential reserves. There is no clear definition in the use of these phrases, leading to serious difficulties in establishing overall statistics.

"Resources," on the contrary, according to Mr Guillemin, inspector general for the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration, are "the complex of concentration anomalies (deposits) which can potentially be exploited." Thus this is a geological term, more properly speaking. To transfer a deposit from the category of resources to the category of reserves--or to promote it in the hierarchy of reserves--is a costly operation. Rather low estimates range from 25 to 50 million francs. This explains a seeming paradox: There are sometimes small reserves of ores known to be abundant, if the mining companies do not make the investment necessary to establish reserves except to meet their needs for a few years.

Uncertainties

The problem of the geologist is mainly to evaluate resources. Professor Skinner at Yale University proposes a method of making estimates based

on the statistical distribution of elements in the earth's crust. This leads to the expectation of serious difficulties in obtaining supplies of tin, chromium, mercury, silver and gold. His colleagues believe his evaluation to be rather pessimistic, and Mr Routhier, research director at the National Center for Scientific Research, suggests a method proposed by a South American geologist which, based on the average depth of the deposits exploited, undertakes to evaluate resources by multiplying the total certain reserves and the tonnage already extracted by 20. In any case, the experience of oil men, farther ahead where future estimates are concerned than ore experts, yields only one certainty--the predictions are always wrong.

This does not prevent undertaking them on condition that the necessary work is carried out. Thus the ore inventories which have been begun in the West European countries lead Mr Guillemin to estimate that the European production of metal could be doubled in the next 10 or 15 years. France has an excellent likelihood of becoming an exporter of tungsten, a good likelihood for lead and zinc, but no hope for chromium.

However the developed countries will remain dependent on the countries in the process of development for a good part of their supplies. Mr Lukman, the general director of the Nigerian Mining Corporation, has issued an appeal for cooperation between the two groups of countries. The developed countries cannot be asked to engage in philanthropy, but they must understand the needs of the countries in the process of development, must find adapted technologies and must respect the environment. "Industrialization should not destroy our cultural traditions," he added.

The problem of raw materials comes therefore within the more general context of the North-South dialogue. It is not limited to that, however, and also has to do with East-West relations, because the Asiatic Continent is one of the most interesting "hunting grounds" in the search for new deposits.

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DISPUTE REPORTED OVER CONSTRUCTION OF HOSPITAL IN KOZANI

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 3 Jul 80 p 40

/Article by our correspondent, A. Papandropoulos/

/Text/ As we reported recently, the Bodosakis Foundation has planned, in the context of its annual projects, the construction of a hospital in Kozani. According to the foundation's official justifications--reported by O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS--the selection of Kozani was dictated by the following considerations:

a. The rapid /economic/ development of an area which is expected to reach 150,000 inhabitants and 31,000 new industrial jobs;

b. The relative underdevelopment of the social and, more specifically, the hospital infrastructure so that it cannot meet the needs to be generated by the area's expected economic development;

c. The area's central location within the western Makedonia region and also within the wider section delineated by the triangle "Ioannina, Larisa-Volos and Salonica";

d. The demographic features of the area which require a developmental policy related to those features;

e. The effort to strengthen the smaller urban centers side by side with a systematic de entralisation policy in the various types of socio-economic activity.

f. The population of the Kozani nome (133,000) which appears to be larger in comparison to the other nomes of western Makedonia.

"Under these conditions, it is considered certain that the new hospital will prove a significant prerequisite for the necessary modernization of the hospital infrastructure not only of the Kozani nome but of the wider area of western Makedonia. This modernisation refers not only to the more efficient functioning of a middle-sized hospital with model require-

ments for Greece (from the point of view of organization, operational planning and construction) but also to the strengthening of a relatively old hospital infrastructure in the area with new units which will be functionally and financially viable on a long-term basis."

This was the closing paragraph of an article in the "Information Bulletin" issued by the /Bodosakis/ Foundation, which also included a map of the area. What is the situation today?

Constructic Cancelled in Kozani

"The preannounced 24-hour warning strike which turned Kozani into a ghost town yesterday (that is, 27 March) scored a great success," to quote the press in Northern Greece. According to the local press, the strike was designed to protest the government's turnabout on the construction of a hospital with a grant by the Bodosakis Foundation. The residents of Kozani want to incorporate the large new hospital together with the existing Mamatseion State Hospital in Kozani in order to establish a modern university clinic to serve the people of western Makedonia.

"Since early morning," to quote the local press, "the church bells have been tolling mournfully." The slogans which dominated the mass meeting at 1130 hours in the Iro Theater read, "Kozani does not condone insults," "We will close down everything until they are ready to listen."

All kinds of stores, restaurants, bakeries, pharmacies, even the sidewalk kiosks, stayed closed. The area transport system was paralyzed as the city and long-distance buses, taxis and trucks were immobilized.

The schools did not function because the students stayed away. The workers and farmers in the area did not go to work. Even the newspapers were not published. For the first time the cool and "conservative" /citizens of/ Kozani unanimously raised their voices against a government decision which in their view is not sound "because it was taken under political pressure."

What is the reason for this outcry by an entire city? Why so much indignation in conservative Kozani? "Because they are playing games with us," to quote Kl. Elevtheriadis, chairman of the Commercial-Industrial Chamber /EVE/ of the Kozani nome. "While everything favors the construction of the hospital in our town, we now have a monkey wrench thrown in in the form of a study based on inaccurate data which proposes to have a large hospital constructed in Ptolemais. As a result, the government changed its mind and made an erroneous decision."

M. Gerondidis, the chairman of the Labor Center here, says: "The government's decision is hasty, ill-considered and offensive to the people of Kozani. The construction of a hospital in Ptolemais is not an impartial action and is not based on economically sound criteria." I. Tsimberis,

chairman of the Commercial Association, says: "As though the problems we have been facing for years have not been enough, we now have to take the insults of the minister of industry."

For its part, the medical board of the Mamatseion General State Hospital of Kozani declared its support for the people of Kozani and in a statement to the Northern Greece press underlined that "the construction of a new, independent hospital with 220 beds (editor's note: it means the one proposed for Ptolemais) cannot offer high quality health care." "The existing hospital is not sufficient to meet the needs of western Makedonia because it lacks basic departments, such as orthopedic, cardiology, urology, communicable diseases, dermatology, intensive care units, laboratory equipment, etc." according to the statement of the Mamatseion Medical Board.

In the same statement, the board expresses support for "incorporating the new hospital into the existing one, thereby creating a large hospital for better care to stop the flow of patients to major urben centers, and to set the foundations for the future development of university clinics."

Technical Chamber of Greece /TEE/ Views

Following the March strike and in the face of new developments, the TEE, Western Makedonia Section, issued on 5 April this statement to the Northern Greece press:

"In view of the current situation, the TEE of western Makedonia invited the engineer members of this chamber to submit suggestions for the selection of a site for the construction of the hospital under the Bodosakis grant in Kozani" taking into consideration the following:

1. The intense interest and the suggestions of the engineer associations in Kozani, Kastoria and Grevena as well as those of the engineers of Ptolemais and Florina and also those of individual members of the chamber with regard to the choice for the hospital site.

2. The hospital needs of the entire western Makedonia region.

3. The existing need for a hospital of university level for the hospi · care of the wider region of western Makedonia in conjunction with the existing Mamatseion Hospital in the Kozani area, a natural center of western Makedonia.

4. The unquestionable absence of a state hopsital in Ptolemais, which must be immediately dealt with, to meet the needs of that town and its environs.

5. The existing needs as /outlined/ in paragraphs 2 and 3 and the projections for the next few years, /which/ call for the parallel construction of the required units, with a speedy governmental decision.

6. The basic weaknesses of the hospital units in other western Makedonia towns such as Grevena, Kastoria and Florina, which call for immediate action.

The TEE statement further states that "following several meetings attended by many members of this chamber, resolved that a decision on the site of the new hospital be postponed in order to have it come out of the third phase and the completion of a Center of Intensive Development Planning /KEPA/ study for Kozani-Ptolemais with the participation of local agencies and organizations."

For its part the government, in view of the situation that has emerged, says that the reason for constructing the hospital in Ptolemais is dictated by the overall infrastructure of the Kozani-Ptolemais axis which is included in the KEPA study and by the social needs of the Ptolemais industrial area.

As far as the Bodosakis Foundation is concerned, they are waiting to see when the narrow interests, petty expediencies, shortsightedness, partisan selfishness and inconsistency of the Greek state will allow the construction of the hospital.

When He Is Not Considered a "Tax Dodger"

One often sees many strange and contradictory events on the Greek political scene. For example, the Communist Party /KKE/ parliamentary deputy, Kon. Kappos, speaking in Parliament, was severely criticizing OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS for a series of articles concerning the grants of the Bodosakis Foundation, and argued that the "seemingly socialist measures" are nothing but tax evasion and tax dodging. The KKE office in Kozani does not seem to be in line with the Kappos dialectic; otherwise, one would be hard put to explain its leading role in "the struggle of the people of Kozani to prevent a change of site for the hospital." What do we have here? The Bodosakis Foundation is "evading taxes" only when one speaks in Parliament? Is it not /evading taxes/ when it comes to the Kozani /hospital/? It is also astonishing that the "progressive" press which usually greets mobilizations such as that of Kozani with the usual "revolutionary" hue and cry remains silent this time. Why? Is it because the public indignation over the change of site indirectly shows who is the donor? And then some people have the affrontery to tell others how to be good journalists and speak of comprehensive news reporting!

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CSO:4906

PARTY LEADER: INDEPENDENCE SPLIT ABETS SOCIALISTS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 15 Jul 80 p 48

[Text] Geir Hallgrimsson, the leader of the Independence Party, said in a speech he gave last Saturday night at Bolungarvik, that conditions had to be created within the Independence Party which would bring together all party members into peaceful and agreeable coexistence, in order to attract more following among the people. "We, the members of the Independence Party, must stand together and united enter into a new battle," said Hallgrimsson. "We must stand united and fight united; but, as is obvious, that unfortunately will not happen while the policy of the present government rules," the leader of the Independence Party said further.

Hallgrimmsson said in his speech that the Independence Party had been the unifying power in Icelandic national life. Now the members of the Independence Party had to face the fact "that some of us have gone our separate ways temporarily." The result of this is that the power of the left-wing is now greater than ever before; the socialists have come to power everywhere in the national life. They have a seat in the cabinet, said Hallgrimsson; they are in charge of the capital and they are in charge of the labor movement. A split within the Independence Party means a stronger position for the socialists. If the situation continues to develop as it is presently developing, the left-wing does not need any member of the Independence Party to secure their power and influence. The leader of the Independence Party said he knew that many of the staunchest members of the party became filled with pessimism when they observed the state of Icelandic politics. We must reverse this pessimism, and increase enthusiasm among party members, as well as, among the whole nation.

In his speech Hallgrimsson mentioned a few tasks the party had to work on in the near future:

a) There must be resistance to official interference; and conditions must be created so that private enterprise can flourish.

b) Something must be done to prevent the fallacy being established here that the welfare of the people is best served by putting all their funds into the public purse.

c) A large-scale employment policy must be formed, where the harnessing of energy from waterfalls and geothermal heat is placed in an appropriate slot in an energy starving world.

d) A split between densely populated areas and sparsely populated areas must be prevented.

e) The election act and the arrangement of electoral districts must be reviewed.

f) An agricultural policy based on national welfare and benefits for farmers must be formed.

9583
CSO: 3111

PAPER COMMENTS ON INDEPENDENCE PARTY SPLIT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 20 Jul 80 p 8

[Editorial: "Sharper Defining Line In Politics"]

[Text] "The Independence Party does not fulfill its obligations by creating conflicts between the classes, a method that is employed by the Peoples' Alliance to gain power. The Independence Party does not fulfill its obligations by introducing artificial proposals for the solutions of economic matters. The Progressive Party claims the monopoly on that. The Independence Party does not fulfill its obligations by employing empty rhetoric. The Democratic Party wants to be the only one doing that. The Independence Party fulfills its obligations by unanimously giving advice on solving the current problems; advice that is founded on the freedom of the individual, his need to be active and his power to make decisions."

This is the way Geir Hallgrimsson, the leader of the Independence Party, in short, differentiated betwee his party and other parties, in a speech he gave last weekend in Bolungarvik at the 50 year celebration of the Independence Party "Thjodolfur." He stated further facts to support his statement by mentioning a few fundamental issues the Independence Party must be on guard against in order to be loyal to the party's own issues and policies. This loyalty will be broken if the party does not differentiate sharply between policy aimed at maintaining the honor and dignity of the ordinary citizen and the policy of the left-wing parties which aim at catching everybody in the all encompassing government net.

Hallgrimsson encouraged resistance towards any further advance of socialism and left-wing politics by saying: "The respect for private property rights is diminishing. The right of the individual for making a decision is decreasing. Official aggression is felt in ever more fields. The interference of the authorities is continually increasing." He touched a sensitive spot of the state hospitals when he said: "Nowhere in civilization has it been confirmed that increased financial government authority will lead to increased economic welfare. The extensive and complicated transfer system that has been established in the country must be exposed. It is a useless system that causes valuables to depreciate during a long transport between many parties... The surest way to economic chaos is to fill your pockets with other people's money."

Most likely the Communists and the Democrats feel the sting most from the last sentence, because their modus operandi is to watch the system closely and, in the name of public welfare, dispose of other people's money. They are even so impudent in their own judgment of this favorite role that they have labeled this disposing of the people's money the "social affairs package."

In his speech Hallgrimsson mentioned other issues than the two mentioned previously, about which it can be said they are the deciding factor when people make up their minds about new ways in political matters. He said that a large-scale employment policy had to be formed, where the harnessing of the power from waterfalls and geothermal heat gets the appropriate attention in an energy starving world; and at the same time would create the basis for general industry and heavy industry. He emphasized that a sensible fishing policy be formed. Regarding contact between sparsely and densely populated areas, Hallgrimsson said: "A split between the sparsely populated areas and the densely populated areas must be prevented. The underlying psychological reasons for such a split must be eliminated. That should be easier now than ever before because of the modern transportation and telecommunications techniques."

Last but not least, Hallgrimsson said that the election act and the arrangement of the electoral districts must be reviewed. He added further: "Such revision is, in my opinion, the prerequisite for the possibility of eliminating misunderstanding and competitiveness between sparsely and densely populated areas; and it is the duty of the Independence Party to point out ways to correct the present state of affairs; not by encroaching on the right of the more sparsely populated and more remote districts, but by rectifying the situation."

As is apparent from these quotes, Hallgrimsson's speech dealt mainly with some main issues but not the issue that is the most prominent in the political struggle, the struggle with the economic chaos. Hallgrimsson confirmed, however, that in that area there is a vast difference of opinion between the policy the Independence Party holds and the government policy. Hallgrimsson said that the prerequisite for successful enforcement of the policy of the Independence Party is unanimity and unity. The speech Hallgrimsson gave in Bolungarvik has made the defining line in the Icelandic political struggle sharper. This speech touched a sore spot in the opponents of the Independence Party and reminded the supporters of the party of the necessity to unite for a new offensive.

9583
CSO: 3111

CHAIRMAN OF 'RED YOUTH' TELLS OF DISENCHANTMENT WITH USSR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Jul 80 p 3

[Interview with Bjorgulv Braanen, Red Youth Chairman, by Thorleif Andreassen, in Skarnes--date not given]

> [Text] "Is Red Youth a collection of self-centered young people?" we asked Bjorgulv Braanen. "Yes, absolutely. We concentrate much too much on our own organization. I can understand the commentators who have characterized us as self-centered," the Red Youth leader said.

AFTENPOSTEN met with Bjorgulv Braanen at Skarnes, where Red Youth is holding a summer camp. We drove into the camp area without being stopped by security officers. "We thought your organization was very particular about controls and security measures," we commented.

"Our camps have always been open to anyone," Braanen explained. "However, there have been variations in the degree of protection. And so this year we have guards. Their job involves watching that fires don't break out, among other things."

All around us on the grass in front of Solbakken Folk High School we observed young people in animated discussions of different political issues. One of the most significant subjects which was being debated was the occupation of Afghanistan. It was clearly apparent that the Soviet Union was finding little or no support among the Red Youth.

"The Soviet Union today is the most aggressive superpower. The danger of war increases because of that nation's aggressiveness. The invasion of Afghanistan, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the war in Eritrea show clearly the character of the Soviet Union's role in the world today," says Braanen, who urges Norwegians to support the resistance movement in Afghanistan.

"Red Youth would like to see cooperation with the Young Right and other groups opposed to the occupation. For the time being, a nonpartisan

Norwegian Afghanistan Committee is working to collect money for humanitarian measures and military support."

[Question] So much for Afghanistan. In your camp schedule, you have raised questions on how the youth policy should be carried out in the 1980's. What exactly is the strategy of Red Youth for the coming years?

[Answer] We are working towards strengthening our support in the college preparatory high schools.

[Question] But don't many young people see you as politically narrow-minded?

[Answer] It is correct that we have a tendency to get caught up in our own ideas. We will have to become more open towards a whole range of ideas now.

[Question] How many members does Red Youth have?

[Answer] I cannot reveal that.

[Question] Weren't we just talking about a greater openness in the organization?

[Answer] We just want to protect the individual members.

[Question] But revealing the number of members surely can't hurt anybody.

[Answer] We know from past history that radical organizations are carefully watched.

[Question] Don't the authorities claim that political observation doesn't go on in Norway?

[Answer] We have had the experience that some of our individual members have had trouble finding employment.

The 150 participants in the camp are involved with other activities than politics. Sports activities such as canoeing, soccer and volleyball are popular with most young people--whether they sympathize with the left or the right side of the political spectrum.

9584
CSO: 3108

HIGH PRICES RESPONSIBLE FOR 6 PERCENT OIL USE DROP

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by Finn Robert Jensen]

[Text] In the course of 12 months--from June 1979 up to and including May 1980--petroleum sales here in Norway were 600 million liters lower than in the 12 previous months. We have saved enough paraffin and fuel oil to heat up 60,000 apartments. Sales of fuel oil 2 have gone down 73 million liters, enough to keep the Norwegian wood products industry going for 100 working days. Combining the reduction of consumption into one figure reveals that the petroleum products saved would be enough for one year's consumption in a city the size of Bergen.

On the national level, consumption has gone down 6 percent, but the reduction within the individual counties varies from 3 to 18 percent. In Oslo, the reduction in the sale of fuel oil in the period from June 1979 to June 1980 was somewhat less than for fuel oil 2. In Akershus, the decrease was respectively 8 percent and 8.2 percent. The Vestfold district, together with Oslo, led in the reduction of sales of fuel oil 1, according to Tore Knudsen, primary consultant for the Oil and Energy Department.

The department has undertaken a study comparing the reduction in consumption to the earlier consumption. In the course of the 12 months under study, the sale of fuel oil 1 has gone down a total of 140 million liters, an amount of oil which would cover consumption in 60,000 apartments for one year.

In the same time period, 73 million less liters of fuel oil 2 were sold. That quantity would cover heating of rooms and water, as well as ventilation, for 40 schools with 25,000 students, 60 large office buildings, with 45,000 employees, 20 hotels with restaurants and 8,000 beds with normal bedclothes, 15 department stores with a combined floor space of 180,000 square meters, 20 swimming and sports halls, 15 hospitals with 60,000 round-the-clock patients, as well as 15 churches.

In the area of heavier fuel oil, there has been a pronounced reduction in consumption. The sale of fuel oil 2 went down 116 million liters from June 1979 to June 1980. That would be enough for the entire Norwegian wood products industry for 100 working days.

The sale of marine fuel oil has gone down 79 million liters. That corresponds to 200 round trips for the Danish boat between Oslo and Copenhagen.

"What do all these figures mean? Have people gotten wiser in their consumption habits?" AFTENPOSTEN asked primary consultant Tore Knudsen.

"I believe that the reduction in sales is the first spontaneous reaction resulting from higher fuel oil prices and requests for conservation of energy. We have noted various concrete examples of energy-saving measures, however. For example, a great number of homeowners made attempts at insulating their houses better last fall.

"People are constantly becoming more aware that it is possible to reduce consumption by taking relatively simple action, without affecting individual comforts or standards of living. In offices, etc., in many locations, large-scale adaptations have been made which help decrease energy consumption. But if we want more radical consumption reduction in the long run, we will still have to prepare ourselves to put more large-scale changes into action," said primary consultant Tore Knudsen.

Higher Price Explains It All

The lessened sale of petroleum products can be largely attributed to price hikes since the beginning of 1979, says general secretary Eiler Holtermann of the Norwegian Petroleum Institute in a commentary. The average rise in the Norwegian market in that time period has been between 85 and 90 percent. This is, practically speaking, the same rise as that which occurred between 1973 and 1974, at the time of the oil crisis, Holtermann points out.

The automobile population continues to grow, but the cars are smaller and more economical. People are using their cars and boats more carefully, and the most recent figures from the Norwegian State Railways indicate a transition to mass transport, the general secretary says. Simultaneous with the reduction in gasoline use, a changeover to low-octane gasoline has occurred. Low-octane gasoline constituted about 32 percent of sales, compared with 27 percent in the same time period last year.

The first 6 months of 1979 and 1980 were both relatively cold, which caused an oil consumption of approximately 10 percent above normal. In the first half of 1979, people started hoarding quite a bit of oil, which explains some of the decline in sales in 1980, but the way things have gone so far also points in the direction of reduced consumption in the future, says Holtermann.

The sales of heavy fuel oil were presumably lower than at any time except prior to 1960. In summing up, the Petroleum Institute leader said that the developments in sales and prices in 1979-80 did not deviate very much from what occurred in 1973-4.

"Some economizing procedures have already been undertaken, and we have also made more progress towards the adaptation process which is necessary in the long run," says Holtermann, who believes that the present situation points in the direction of reduced consumption.

9584
CSO: 3108

LIBERAL, CENTER PARTIES SHOULD COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Jul 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Wikstrom In Almedalen"]

[Text] Is there life in the central parties after all? If one reads the speech Jan-Erik Wikstrom gave in Almedalen Thursday evening and Nils G. Asling's article in the DN-debatt section for the day, one can find striking similarities in the argumentation and outlook. Since the nuclear power issue was removed from the daily agenda, the Center Party and the Liberal Party must have rediscovered how close they stand to each other. If they want to assert themselves against the parties on the left and the right, they must do it together.

Wikstrom and Asling attack the flight of the Social Democrats from the responsibility of the country's economy. In the parliament the party has criticized the budgetary deficit, and at the same time demanded more expenditures. In addition, they have said no to all savings proposals the administration has introduced.

The party leadership and the social democratic press show a definite lack of interest in discussing the problem in a realistic manner.

The same applies, according to Wikstrom and Asling, to the economic issues. Rather than making structural changes easier, the Social Democrats put forth a series of proposals for trade funds, development funds, structural funds and wage earners funds. They postpone all problems for the future and apply themselves mostly to trying to preserve the existing places of work in accordance with union wishes.

The criticism is justifiable, but when it is brought forth by two members of the administration, it must be said that a great part of the criticism reflects on themselves. The administration has said that the gap between income and expenditures in the next budget must be reduced by 7 billion kroner. Hardly a critic outside the administration will be found who will defend this deferment of the economic reorganization. The criticism among the press is unanimous. The restraint should have been implemented last year, when the state of the economy was on an upward trend, and not during the probable recession of 1981.

None of the parties in government, certainly not the Center Party, is without blame when it comes to preserving an obsolete economic structure. The actions taken to rescue companies that met with crisis in 1977-78, in the lumber industry among others, have unnecessarily delayed a number of layoffs and thereby restricted the availability of the work force that other companies could have used during the economic up-swing. The financial distress of these companies could have been solved without this negative structural effect.

Wikstrom and Aisling do not stand on the best possible platform when they accuse the Social Democrats of shirking their responsibility and when they demand an alternative from Palme.

After Gosta Bohman's speech in Uppsala where he stole the liberalism from the Liberal Party, the Liberal Party cabinet ministers are of the opinion that they openly can polemize against their conservative colleagues in the cabinet. Wikstrom said that those who attack liberalism in order to build up "egoism and competition" are actually on the right track--if one thinks about Bohman's variation of liberalism. He said that the Conservatives "seem to lack insight into the problem of the private power concentration" and even "accept" such power concentration.

Wikstrom disassociated himself from the discussion about abolishing support for the first child; reducing foreign aid and liberalizing the alcohol policy. The unwillingness of the Conservatives to take a stand regarding a general clause in the tax system "can easily be understood as if they--in the name of unlimited freedom--are standing guard over those who support the current tax system. Their indecision appears in the same way with regard to stiff capital gains taxation as an ideologically dependent and fixed observation built around the interests of the privileged." Finally, Wikstrom accused the Conservatives of resisting measures for increased equality between men and women.

The three-party government is fragile! Can it withstand the strain of such a controversial stand? We can expect many anxious warnings to the politicians in the center to start thinking of solidarity and stop bickering from now on.

It is impossible for the administration to work together without open discussion. The Liberal Party and the Center Party only work with the Conservatives on the condition that the policy guidelines be decided in the center. There is no majority support for a right-wing policy in the parliament or among the people. The difference must be shown and discussed before the voters can understand the policy the administration actually pursues.

9583
CSO: 3109

JP'S EAGERNESS FOR EARLY ELECTIONS QUESTIONED

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 19 Jul 80 p 6

/Article by Teoman Erel: "Reluctant Elections"/

/Text/ "Last minute" comments in the July issue of HEDEF magazine, which supports the JP /Justice Party/, include the following:

"Actually the Justice Party's desire for early elections seems perverse under the present circumstances. The rising cost of living and mounting anarchy lately are seen as events which could wear down the JP, now in power, albeit as a minority."

In a report in TERCUMAN, Guneri Civaoglu expressed his views on this topic as follows:

"These prices, this unstoppable anarchy, trouble making ends meet, shut-down workplaces...

"Plunking down the ballot box in the middle of such a scene would not be to the JP's advantage."

Prime Minister and JP General Chairman Suleyman Demirel, however, continues to appear in favor of early elections in the fall.

Why, in fact, does Demirel want early elections?

According to NSP /National Salvation Party/General Chairman Necmettin Erbakan, a recent champion of early elections, the JP does not actually want early elections. NSP members say this often:

"Look, we announced that we were in favor of early elections. The JP authorities came to us, but said nothing serious."

The NSP is trying to back each of them into a corner -- the RPP which does not want early elections and the JP whose position is indeterminate.

What they are saying to the RPP is this:

"You have until 19 August. If you say yes to the national view-restoration government, we will pull down the present government. If you do not give a positive reply, we will join the JP and the NAP /Nationalist Action Party/ to get a decision for early elections."

If the RPP does not say yes to the NSP by 19 August, the professor /Erbakan/ will then turn to the JP and give them his conditions for early elections.

We do not know the intricacies of these conditions. But the call that will be made publicly will have to do with "election security." Private conversations among NSP members go like this:

"If early elections are held while this government is in power, it will be impossible either to ensure election security or prevent partisanship."

"So what is to be done?"

"Either form a new government or neutralize seven ministries prior to the elections as it will not do to be content with the three ministers left to neutrals according to the constitution. Other than Interior, Justice and Communications which are the three ministries to be given to neutrals under the constitution, Public Works, Forests, Village Affairs and National Education should be given to neutrals too, as they are most conducive to partisanship. Otherwise, the JP'ers are terrible partisans. They put a bulldozer in front of every village and say, 'If you vote for us, we will do your work.'"

Of course, Erbakan will tell Mr Suleyman politely that the neutrals to be appointed to these ministries should be selected from among people who look kindly on the NSP.

According to this situation, this double-threat policy aimed at both the RPP and the JP will put the squeeze on Ecevit by the middle of August and later on Demirel.

Because the question "What will the NSP do?" will be revived with the parliamentary question on the interior minister, Erbakan will be able to occupy the place he wants in the newspaper headlines and on the television screens.

You may ask: "Will there be early elections?" As far as we can tell, no party is dying for early elections except the NAP, which has got into its head the idea of deeper involvement in the state as the JP's official coalition partner. The JP administration, however, realizes that it cannot put off next winter and, in the meantime, cannot change the electoral system or the constitution and, in this case, may turn "reluctantly" to

early elections in which a JP-NAP coalition could win. Erbakan, meanwhile, is using early elections for the moment as the stuff of a short-term policy. But this is a dangerous maneuver. Demirel may tell Erbakan in August:

"I dare you, Professor. Come on, let's have early elections."

Then Erbakan may be forced, reluctantly, into early elections. If, of course, no last minute disagreements arise over the conditions for early elections and the choice of neutral ministers amenable to the national view!

8349
CSO: 4907

EFFECTIVE RPP SAID ESSENTIAL TO REGIME'S SURVIVAL

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 11 Jul 80 p 5

/Article by Teoman Erel: "We Burn Out the Motor Unless the RPP is Working"/

/Text/ If Mr Suleyman is happy about the ineffectiveness and disorganization in the major opposition party, he is making a big mistake. If JP /Justice Party/ members are toasting "The RPP is finished," it will happen also to them. Of course, it will happen to all of us and to the regime, not just to the JP.

If you ask, "So what if the RPP falls apart?" our answer is:

"The motor; we burn out the motor."

It happened to a friend of ours the other day. We were riding down a long stretch of road together. It was hot; the roads were empty because of rising fuel prices. We got to Ankara in pretty good time. Just as we were approaching the city, the driver got a little worried.

"The oil gauge is flickering," he said, "But the car is going all right."

As we started up the slope at Cankaya, the gauge flickered again; our friend could not figure it out.

"The gauge light is probably broken," he said. "There's nothing wrong with the motor."

After a few minutes, the car suddenly lost power and the bearings started knocking. We were indecisive because the gauge was not working, and we burned out the motor.

If the gauge had worked properly, we would have known when the engine started to labor. We could have parked somewhere and made repairs before the problem got worse.

Acting on this example, let us dwell a little on the RPP's not doing its job and falling apart.

In a healthy democracy, the major opposition party is a very important guage. If the opposition, assembled deep in society, is effectively and properly channeled and can give a strong signal so that the administration can put on brakes when necessary, the regime's motor will be safe. Irreparable or very costly damage will not be done.

Turkey has a hell driver at the wheel at the moment. Mr Suleyman is giving it all the gas it will take. He is trying to overcome the wobble in the wheels by brash courage and speed. His advisor Turgut Ozal is even more of a daredevil.

"Step on it," he keeps saying. "We have the whole road."

They are hoping to reach their destination as soon as possible and replace the car. But it is not just the wheels; the old dear's engine is wearing out, too. The hotter it gets, the worse it is on her heart.

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ANKARA-ISTANBUL RAILWAY LINE UNDERGOING REROUTING

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 13 Jul 80 pp 3, 4

/Article by Sezai Bayar: "Ankara-Istanbul in 4.5 Hours"/

/Text/ With this old world living in the jet age and time as precious as gold, it still takes us 11 hours to go from Istanbul to Ankara by train, a time that may be considered a record in reverse according to other nations. If we can spare a little more money, it is possible to make the trip in 7.5 hours on the Blue Train, but even this is too long. However, when service begins on the new Istanbul-Ankara railroad, which was advertised for bids in 1976 and which will cost 100 billion liras overall, this time will be reduced to 4.5 hours. Thus we will be rescued from "killing time" on the old line which is now 420 kilometers long and will move up to modern transportation. While the railroads are in fierce competition with highway transportation, the new railroad will bring economic vigor to the places it passes through.

Work is proceeding at a feverish pace now on the new railway route which will be 260 kilometers long. Impassable mountains are being carved out by workers and experts working like slaves, bridges are being built and electrification grids expanded. All this so we can make the trip in less time.

What places will the new railroad go through? The new railroad which will lop 160 kilometers off the old line and thus get us between Ankara and Istanbul in 4.5 hours will bypass Bilecik, Eskisehir and Polatli, linking Arifiye with Sincan. According to the prepared project, the new railroad follows the old Haydarpasa-Gebze-Izmit-Arifiye route, going from Arifiye to Beypazari and from there to Sincan. Thus all the locations through which the railroad passes on this new route, primarily Beypazari, will gain economic vitality. The mountainous terrain of the area, especially between Cayirhan and Sincan, however, complicates the work in this region, requiring back-to-back tunnels in four different places.

According to information given by the experts, our nation now needs 2,000 kilometers of railway including major lines. Moreover, our existing railroads need to be modernized for rapid freight transport. In fact, after double-track electrification and the introduction of deisel locomotives, the need was felt for a double-track, high-speed transportation system between Istanbul and Ankara. Since modern standards seemed applicable to

the present Istanbul-Arifiye and Ankara-Sincan links, construction was begun of the double-track line. The Arifiye-Sincan rail line came under consideration when the existing Istanbul-Ankara single-track railroad could no longer meet the needs, and the line was advertised for bids in 1976.

Those concerned point out that the Arifiye-Sincan line is the most important part of the new project and that 182 double-track electric trains per day will be able to operate when needed on the new line, the project for which includes the most modern signalization and safety features. Noting that 27 double-track trains now operate on the old line, officials said that passenger capacity would thus be increased also.

Mountains, Tunnels, Bridges

Construction of the tunnels along the new railroad route is progressing rapidly. Officials /said that/ when the new line is in operation, passengers going from Istanbul to Ankara will travel a full 71 kilometers of the 260-kilometer road (approximately one-fourth) in tunnels. Thus costs are raised also by construction of the long tunnels. The existing Istanbul-Ankara railroad, meanwhile, has only 3 kilometers of tunnels.

According to information given by officials, 2,380 meters of tunnel has been completed, including a 200-meter open stretch at the Ayas Tunnel, 320 meters on the Sincan side and another 1,869 meters also on the Sincan side. In contrast, however, construction has not yet started on the 14.5 kilometers of the Koroglu Tunnel. When this tunnel is finished, it will be the longest tunnel in Turkey.

Meanwhile, five separate contractors reportedly are working on the 85-kilometer stretch between Sincan and Cayirhan. According to the information given, the work includes, going from Sincan to Cayirhan, the Ankara River Bridge, the Sincan Tunnel which is 912 meters long, the Ovacayi fill, a 410-meter tunnel here, the 200-meter throughway at the Ayas Tunnel, Sincan Station, Beypazari Highway underpass, the 143-meter Kirmir River Bridge, the Kirmir tunnels which are 911 and 980 meters long and the 7,082 meters of the Cayirhan tunnels.

100 Billion Liras

The overall cost of building the new line will be approximately 100 billion liras, including a foreign loan of $200 million, at 1980 unit prices, officials said. Meanwhile, the new line reportedly will not be ready for service until 1986, owing to construction time required to build the long tunnels. To date, the Communications Ministry has completed a total of 3.2 billion liras of the work, 1.9 billion liras by 1980 and 1.3 billion liras in the first 5 months of this year, it was announced.

Old-New Difference

Principal features of the old and new Istanbul-Ankara railroads:

	Old	New
Travel time	11, 7.5 hrs	4.5 hrs
Length of line	420 km	260 km
Smallest curve radius	300 m	2,500 m
Steepest incline	1000/25	1000/12.5
Total tunnel length	3 km	71 km

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